ISSN : 0023-3900
The purpose of this study is to analyze Korea’s aging society in terms of public conflict, to analyze the conflict issues that aging will bring, and to present a pre-emptive response. Methods adopted to this end include a literature review and comparative case analyses involving Korea and Japan. Three issues of public conflict were selected in the literature review: (1) increased demand for cremation facilities, (2) expansion of elderly care and dementia facilities, and (3) job competition between the young and elderly due to the extended legal retirement age. Then, by applying the conflict process frame of Ralf Dahrendorf and Lewis Coser, the two countries were analyzed in terms of structural situations, deepening awareness of these situations, and mobilization of organizational-political power. The study thereby deduced implications regarding the differences between the two countries. Korea and Japan are experiencing similar social phenomena or problems due to aging. However, there are some differences between the countries in how these phenomena are perceived and how the problems are solved. The background of these differences can be summarized as (1) long-standing ideological confrontation in Korea, (2) differences between Japan and Korea in the cultural perception of conflict, and (3) differences in governance in terms of social consensus and institutional acceptance.
The purpose of this study is to identify the social causes of the younger generation’s growing disgust toward the elderly in Korean society. Generational conflict is likely to occur in any society, but it becomes a serious social problem if that conflict turns into disgust, as is the case in Korean society today. Though the elderly as a group are diverse, the younger generation tends to see them as homogenous and expresses disgust by generalizing negative perceptions of particular seniors to the group as a whole. The first social cause of the young generation’s hatred toward the elderly is the negative perception of physical aging. Physical aging causes slowness in judgment and action. Physical aging leads to atrophy of the appearance, and a strong trend has emerged in Korean society of rejecting the atrophy of appearance due to aging. As a result, the elderly are likely to have a negative image due to their appearance. Another social cause is found in the language use, attitude, and behavior caused by the embodiment of historical values and experiences of the elderly. The language, attitude, and behavior of the elderly, who are familiar with traditional hierarchical order and Confucian culture, but who have had little opportunity to learn civic consciousness, prompt disgust from the younger generation, which has been socialized by notions of democratic relations, horizontal culture, and civic consciousness. In addition, as negative images of the elderly are rapidly shared through social media, a common tool of the younger generation, such hatred is allowed to spread. A final social cause of antipathy towards the elderly is the feeling among Korean youth that they are being alienated from fair competition and the labor market. The outpouring of this anger leads to disgust.
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of age in the elderly population on electoral politics in a rapidly aging Korean society by using the results of a survey conducted after the 21st general elections. In particular, we empirically analyze the perception of senior voters on policy salience as well as on the expansion of government spending on senior welfare programs as part of a debate on silver democracy, which forecasts a senior-dominated representative democracy as the impact of senior citizens on elections increases concomitant with their growing numbers. Our results demonstrate that voter age is not an important factor affecting policy preference, and that support for the expansion of government spending on welfare policies for the elderly does not exhibit a statistically significant correlation with age. Yet, according to a cluster analysis of senior voters, four clusters we identified could be clearly divided along the income and ideology dimensions. Finally, this paper provides five possible explanations for why age seems to have no impact on voters’ reaction to the expansion of government spending on welfare programs or senior welfare policies.
Super-aged societies experience a large increase in the proportion of elderly with limited mobility who face significant challenges accessing transportation. Telecommunication services, namely video calling, has structural limitations in meeting the mobility needs of an aging population. In order to address the limited mobility of the elderly, this study suggests an alternative telecom model to utilize the opposite party as an avatar: a remote-controlled videocall transporter who under the user’s control moves to the user’s desire location. This alternative telecom model is defined as real avatar service. To highlight the utility of real avatar service, this study first explores the structural limitations of enhancing passenger transport and telecommunications to address the challenge of limited mobility faced by a growing elderly population. Then, inspired by theories of media determinism, it designs an alternative telecom model to shape the avatar-in-reality. Finally through a literature review, it demonstrates how shaping the elderly’s avatar-in-reality is a useful alternative, functionally distinguished from existing telecom services and transportation, for enhancing the mobility of the elderly.
The similarity of Dasan Jeong Yagyong and King Jeongjo derives from the belief that the ruler should carry out politics for the people. According to Dasan, the ruler is chosen by the people or appointed by the Mandate of the Lord on High. The former reveals Dasan’s ideal view of politics, while the latter conveys his realistic perspective. He claims that the Mandate represents the will of the people; thus, the ruler was chosen by them. The ruler being appointed by the Mandate is similar to Jeongjo’s thought. However, Dasan believes that the ruler learns the rules of the Mandate by observing the people, as opposed to Dasan’s belief that the ruler should be assisted by a minister in possession of that knowledge. Although Jeongjo makes no mention of the people’s selection of their ruler, he regarded himself as father of the people, believing the ruler should care for the people as his own children. Consequently, Jeongjo tried to strengthen his royal power. Dasan also viewed the ruler as father of the people; thus, the ruler’s duty was to ensure the people lived properly. To achieve this, the ruler had to reform the system of governance and therefore required strong royal authority.
This paper deals with the preparation and documentation activities of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMOFA) for the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Between 1946 and 1949, JMOFA produced seven volumes of pamphlets on territorial issues in the preparation process leading up to the peace treaty. Among them, a series of four pamphlets under the title of Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper was published. These pamphlets were distributed to the Allied Powers to good effect. Focus was placed on the Southern Kuriles, Ryukyus, and Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo), which Japan felt should be recognized as Japanese territory by the Allies. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan restored peaceful relations with the United States and its major allies, but hostile relations between Japan and its neighbors in East Asia persisted. It was natural that the Soviet Union (Russia), China, and Korea, excluded from the Peace Treaty, later came to engage in territorial disputes with Japan.
The Government-General of Colonial Korea (GGCK) conducted an extensive investigation into tenant practices in colonial Korea in order to deal with the colony’s social problems, especially the expansion and radicalization of tenancy disputes during the 1920s. The results of this investigation were compiled in The Tenant Practices of Korea (Chōsen no kosaku kankō 朝鮮の小作慣行; 1932). This report enumerated the complex landlord-tenant relationship into simplified statistical data, and social conflicts were moved from the field of disputes to policy discussions based on tenancy statistics and implementation of legislative measures. Based on this statistical survey, the Joseon Farmland Ordinance (Chōsen nōchirei 朝鮮農地令) was enacted in 1934, which fundamentally altered practices surrounding tenancy disputes. Specifically, the survey provided social median data and indicators for tenancy periods, rents, and rent reduction rates for a lean year, which became the new political apparatus for the settling of tenancy disputes. At the same time, by enumerating colonial society, the colonial state earned the opportunity to actively intervene in social conflicts. The GGCK began to present itself as the mediator or regulator of social conflicts, setting apart from the old image of target of antagonism. This is a historical case that illustrates the power effects of systematized knowledge (/statistics) on the agricultural politics of colonial society.
The present analysis illuminates the impact of tradition in the constitution of North Korean revolutionary womanhood based on the regime’s idealizing narratives of Joseonot (traditional Korean dress). After the Korean War, the cultivation of socialist personalities for the working Joseon nyeoseong (North Korean women) became increasingly wedded to traditional models of sacrifice, both in and outside the home. To avoid the reductionism of explanations centered on patriarchy or the gendered nature of the North Korean state, this study argues that the pronounced weight of tradition in constructing revolutionary womanhood after the Korean War should be attributed to the pressing urgency of anti-revisionism during the political crisis of legitimacy in the mid-1950s. Faced with mounting dissent in the wake of de-Stalinization, Kim Il-sung claimed exclusive political legitimacy and superior nationalism based on his self-proclaimed mandate to dictate Juche (selfreliance). Accordingly, the aesthetical and ideological attention given to women’s Joseonot represents a facet of socialist indoctrination unique to 1955–1960, rather than a gendered dress code rooted in patriarchy. The formulation of Joseonot as the socialist Korean women’s dress epitomized the interplay between revolutionary and national essence central to Pyongyang’s postcolonial socialist modernity and claim to nation-wide leadership. Throughout the process of regime consolidation, the question of how socialist Joseon nyeoseong is became inseparable from how genuinely Korean she is.
This study examines North Korea’s architecture and construction culture in the post-war recovery period of the 1950s. At that time, North Korea had the opportunity to transition into a modern socialist country by replacing its premodern traditions. To understand the country’s construction culture, this study examines various phenomena related to values, norms, and goals through representative texts written by Kim Il-sung and other published North Korean sources from the 1950s. These documents clarify how North Korean buildings and infrastructure were constructed for decades. First, North Korea built modernized socialist cities using concrete and practical policies utilizing standardized designs and prefabricated construction methods that were made possible by new mechanization and mass industrialization of building materials. Second, as the value of workers grew, various amenities were created for them, including new buildings, nurseries, dry cleaners, and cultural facilities. Third, during post-war reconstruction, the urban development that began in Pyongyang was completed simultaneously in regional cities. Finally, educational institutions with construction-related technical departments were established, including Kim Il-sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology. However, the modernization efforts did not occur simply because North Korea became a modern nation; rather, it was the embodiment of North Korean society and party policies centered upon Kim Il-sung.