This paper explores the question of just war theory as it applies to the Korean War by relying on the work of Michael Walzer. In the first section, I discuss this issue with regards to the initiation of and intervention in the Korean War. North Korea violated the principles of just war by fabricating its invasion as a response to South Korean aggression. The U.S. intervention in the Korean War was a defensive war for the United States and the free world rather than a war defending South Korea alone. The U.S.S.R. violated legitimate procedures of just war, by covering up its involvement through deception. China’s intervention was based on presumptive assumptions that the war in North Korea was a threat to China’s state security and that the United States could attack China. In the second section, I examine the issue of justice in war conduct. Walzer emphasizes that the engaged states should seriously consider the means used to win a battle no less than the victory itself. This paper examines this issue by considering civilian casualties from U.S. air bombing and the execution of members of the National Guidance League (Gungmin Bodo Yeonmaeng). This paper concludes, based on the discussion of the above two issues, with a judgment on the responsibilities for the intervention in and the waging of the Korean War.
Immediately after the recapture of Seoul on September 28, 1950, the Rhee Syngman administration arrested and killed those who were suspected of having collaborated with North Korean forces during the North Korean occupation of South Korea in 1950. The government invoked special rules to conduct a nationwide sweep against the collaborators, which, in turn, exacerbated the internal conflicts between refugees and non-refugees. The Joint Investigation Committee (JIC) was established to arrest and investigate, with no clear legal basis, those who were suspected of having collaborated with the North. Collaborators were also considered unpatriotic and treacherous, and thus were deprived of property rights. Overall, the Rhee administration’s draconian punishment against collaborators sought their exclusion from society. At the same time, the Second National Assembly, which was strongly against the position of the Rhee administration, came into conflict with the government. The National Assembly later revised the special rules and abolished the JIC. In the end, however, the arrest and execution of suspected collaborators carried out by the Rhee Syngman administration constituted a turning point toward anticommunism after the Korean War.
King Sejong practiced faithfully the Confucian policies that had been established with the foundation of the new Joseon dynasty. He was a typical Confucian king who repressed Buddhism, which had been the state religion in the preceding Goryeo dynasty. When he expressed support for a Buddhist event of repairing the sarigak at Heungcheonsa temple in the capital in the 17th year of his reign (1435), however, King Sejong came into conflict with his Confucian subjects. The opposition assumed various aspects in the process until the conflict came to an end, and the will of King Sejong was accomplished in the 24th year of his reign (1442). Previous studies have interpreted the Buddhismfriendly events of the Confucian King Sejong from the viewpoints of social, national, and religious necessity as well as of functionalism, usefulness, and practicability. This paper, however, pays attention to the reasoning structure of King Sejong. It aims to show that while Confucian subjects argued on the basis of Zhu Xi’s theory of heterodoxy, King Sejong employed zhongyong (doctrine of the mean) in the conflicts with his subjects on Buddhist events. In addition, this paper examines the relationship between Zhu Xi’s theory of heterodoxy and the theory of zhongyong, and gives ideological meaning to the arguments between King Sejong and his subjects.
The Four-Seven Debate was an attempt to explain human feelings in terms of their ontological basis. In this article, I intend to offer a better understanding of the debate by analyzing some of the conceptions that play a significant role in it. I choose this method for three reasons: this line of approach to the debate has been very rare though not completely new; the conclusion derived by such an approach has been inaccurate and indecisive; and the philosophical connotation of the word “bal 發” (fa in Chinese pronunciation) has not been well recognized. In what follows, I begin with analyzing and examining the three candidates for the meaning of the word “bal” in the context of the six Propositions introduced in the Four-Seven Debate concerning the relationship between the Four-Seven and i-gi (li-qi in Chinese pronunciation). In consequence, I arrive at the conclusion that there is no universal translation of bal that fits all the Propositions and also that Gobong’s final Proposition concerning the aforesaid relationship returns the Four-Seven Debate to the starting point.
Shin Yun-bok’s (1758-?) satire, which pointed out the hedonistic social aspect in the capital of Joseon, constituted a blow to the noblemen’s moral authority. We can see in his paintings that in the late Joseon dynasty, the ruling ideology, Confucianism, became sullied and collapsed in its faculties as both mental principles and basis for social order. Shin’s genre paintings show by way of ridicule that he rejected the traditional structure of Confucian aesthetics and devalued the fixed relationship between image and text. The two significant characteristics of Shin’s style of genre paintings are “one icon representing two codes” and “leverage of ideology and mentalité.” Shin’s genre paintings are a meaningful landmark because they showed and established a new order of mentalité. The mentalité established in inverse proportion to that situation, however, was also not sound. Even though Shin disclosed the moral collapse by satirically criticizing the hedonistic life of the yangban class in his paintings, the very depictions expressed in Shin’s works also captured the social changes and emergences of modernity. This is a significant virtue of Shin’s paintings
This article reveals the process of identity formation and transformation of a rural Korean folk village following its tourism development. The commercialization of cultural heritage, whether inherited from the ancestors of its residents or borrowed from other rural villages, allows for the appearance of a unique local identity. The newly constructed local identity initiated by tourism, however, can undermine other kinds of preexisting identity of the village. In Oeam village, after the introduction of tourism, locality is replacing lineage or blood ties in the making of a new identity. The local identity shared by the villagers may also differ, depending on the degree of their involvement, socioeconomic interests in tourism, and their lineages. For example, some villagers, who did not belong to the dominant lineage, were not able to possess their own distinctive identity because of their low socioeconomic and political status in the village. Now, the emergence of noticeable local identity can be found among them in the village thanks to their active involvement in the tourism development. On the other hand, relatively wealthy villagers with high lineage status still show a strong attachment to traditional consanguineous identity. Therefore, much more complicated and competing identities can emerge in the village, depending on the extent of the villagers’ participation in tourism.
The Muslim community in Korea first appeared in the 1950s and has grown with increasing inflow of foreign workers to Korean society. Loosely communicated through Islam, the community develops its own identity and culture, diversifies ethnically, and remains isolated from the larger Korean society. Once it grows large enough to have a collective voice, however, there are two paths open to Muslims in Korea. One is the “interstitial identity,” meaning that they participate neither in the politics of the majority Korean society nor that of the origin country. The other is a “reconstituted identity” that aspires for integration into mainstream Korean society by actively participating while preserving their distinctiveness. The current Korean government’s multicultural policy may drive Muslims in Korea to take the first path. The current development of the Muslim community in Korea, however, may demand that the Korean government and people employ more inclusive multiculturalism policies to facilitate Muslims in Korea to take the second path. This reflective situation offers Korean society an opportunity to change the current multicultural policy oriented towards differential exclusion and assimilation into a more inclusive model of multiculturalism.
This article investigates intercultural misunderstandings between Koreans and Malays at work that may prevent Korean companies from becoming key players in global collaboration. It utilizes “sociology of knowledge” developed by Karl Mannheim and the sociocultural value orientation of Fons Trompenaars to understand the root cause and sources of conflicts in industrial settings. Korean society has always emphasized homogeneity as a basic feature of its cultural identity and integration. To outsiders, however, this may be viewed as Koreans’ ethnocentricity. Experience suggests that the more Korean companies invest overseas, the more intercultural communication problems crop up in their international interactions, which can be attributed to lack of understanding of intercultural differences and diversity. In this respect, this research could contribute towards conflict resolution through mutual understanding. It concludes that one of the main causes of conflict is the different perspectives of various groups on how they look at reality and nature, which influence their understanding of problems and circumstances, or what Mannheim terms the “definition of the situation.”