

“Dynamics of Contention” in Democratic Korea: *The Role of Anti-Americanism* *

Sunhyuk KIM and Eun Sun LEE

Abstract

This paper analyzes the symbiotic and mutually reinforcing relationship between the anti-American movement and other social movements in democratic South Korea since 1987. Proposing a new typology of anti-Americanism, the paper formulates and develops an argument that the anti-American movement has substantially contributed to the success and survival of South Korea’s social movements. The anti-American movement should not be classified as one of the many social movements active in South Korea; rather, it is a special movement that performs various functions integral to the rise, expansion, unity, and success of social movements in general. The collaboration of the anti-American movement and other social movements is also transforming the character of the anti-American movement itself. The metamorphosis of the anti-American movement into diverse new social movements makes it more sophisticated, accessible, appealing, open, and flexible. Thus transformed, the anti-American movement will likely provide an important source of vitality for civic engagement and make significant contributions to South Korean democracy.

Keywords: anti-Americanism, social movements, contentious politics, protests, democracy

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I. Introduction

South Korea's transition to democracy in 1987 was an outcome of protracted confrontation and conflict between Chun Doo-hwan's authoritarian regime and an extensive pro-democracy coalition in civil society. Chun preferred to maintain the authoritarian status quo by forgoing the electoral system and designating his successor. However, nationwide protests organized and led by a grand coalition of student groups, labor unions, religious organizations, and opposition parties compelled the Chun government to accommodate democratic reforms, including the immediate adoption of a direct presidential election system (S. Kim 2000a).

In terms of the mode of democratic transition, therefore, what differentiates South Korea from earlier instances of democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America was the prominence of social movements and civic mobilization (S. Kim 2000b). South Korea's democratization was not a "pacted" transition characterized by pacts and negotiation between differing—and often conflicting—factions of political elite. Civil society was not merely "resurrected" as a result of elite-led "liberalization" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, ch. 5). Rather, "contentious politics" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) between the state and civil society consistently characterized South Korea's democratic transition (S. Kim 2002). For these reasons, Choi (2005) used the term "democratization via movement" to encapsulate South Korea's transition to democracy. Considering the centrality of civil society and social movements in the process of democratic transition that occurred in the 1980s, it is of course and utmost importance to ask how the "dynamics of contention" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1998) between the state and civil society have unfolded since the democratic transition in 1987.

This paper traces and analyzes the evolution of social movements in South Korea after its transition to democracy in 1987. We focus on the anti-American movement in particular. The main argument formulated and developed in this paper is that the anti-American movement has contributed to the success and survival of South

Korea's social movements at large in the politics of democratic consolidation and deepening since 1987. The anti-American movement is not just one of the many social movements in South Korea. Rather, it is a special movement that performs various functions helpful to the rise, expansion, unity, and success of social movements in general.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we define anti-Americanism and operationalize it by distinguishing its four main types. In section III, we examine the historical origins and development of the anti-American movement before 1987. In section IV, we survey the overall development of the anti-American movement since 1987. In section V, we discuss how the anti-American movement and other major social movements have interacted with each other and co-evolved since South Korea's transition to democracy. In section VI, we summarize the main findings of the paper and contemplate future prospects for contentious politics in South Korea.

II. Anti-Americanism: Definitional and Typological Issues

Scholars have offered diverse definitions of "anti-Americanism." One of the most recent and authoritative definitions is found in Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, 12), where anti-Americanism is defined as "a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general." Defined as such, anti-Americanism is a multidimensional phenomenon involving cognitive, emotional, and normative dimensions. Also, anti-Americanism manifests itself in different forms, such as opinion, distrust, and bias. Of these forms, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, 12) maintain that bias is the most fundamental and enduring.

One important limitation of Katzenstein and Keohane's definition of anti-Americanism is that it focuses exclusively on the United States as the target of anti-Americanism without adequately considering the "logic of two-level games" (Putnam 1988). When anti-Americanism emerges and expands in a specific country, it is often not solely about the United States. Anti-Americanism sometimes targets that nation's

domestic government that is supported and sponsored by, and collaborates with, the United States. In particular, when the incumbent government is authoritarian, the pro-democracy movement against the ruling government is often combined with anti-Americanism. Additionally, anti-Americanism sometimes targets U.S. military bases stationed in a country. Lastly, anti-Americanism can target a broader global ideological campaign if it is suspected to be led by the United States. In sum, anti-Americanism is not merely about the United States and its society. There are multiple levels outside of the United States in which anti-Americanism manifests itself.

In this paper, therefore, we expand on Katzenstein and Keohane's rather unidimensional definition of anti-Americanism by developing a new typology. Based on the recent anti-Americanism in South Korea, we distinguish four types of anti-Americanism. Type A (essential anti-Americanism) is a conventional anti-Americanism not far from Katzenstein and Keohane's definition. It opposes the American government, society, and culture, signifying fundamental opposition to the very values that make the United States. In comparison, type B (policy-level anti-Americanism) is not opposed to the United States *per se*; rather, it is opposed to specific U.S. policies. Type B anti-Americanism means opposition to the actions of the United States. It focuses on the presumed negative effects of U.S. policies on South Korea's politics, economy, society, and relations with North Korea.¹

Type C (base-related anti-Americanism) is a movement that criticizes various issues related to U.S. Army bases in South Korea. Several prominent criminal incidents and high-profile environmental scandals in the 1980s and 1990s involved U.S. Army bases. Movement leaders reprimanded both the United States and South Korean governments for being unable and/or unwilling to properly handle the

1. In practice, a movement may show characteristics of multiple types. Protesters at various U.S. Cultural Centers in South Korea in the 1980s, for example, were not entirely against the United States *in toto*—some of them presumed that democracy-loving ordinary American citizens would sympathize with and support pro-democracy movement in South Korea.

crimes and environmental disasters related to U.S. military bases. Lastly, type D (global anti-Americanism) is opposed to American-led globalization. It rejects not only market opening and trade liberalization but also any external pressure for making domestic political, economic, and social institutions and practices similar to American ones. It basically resists globalization as led and dominated by the United States.

Type A and type B are commonly defined in existing typologies of anti-Americanism such as Katzenstein and Keohane (2007). Type C is a new addition that takes into account U.S. military-related issues, which have been critical in mobilizing anti-Americanism in recent South Korean political history. Type D is another addition representing a new form of anti-Americanism that emerged in the aftermath of the recent wave of globalization. Since 2000, the United States has often been identified and criticized as one of the major supporters and promoters of globalization in anti-globalization movements and campaigns. As such, anti-Americanism at the global level, expressed in transnational antiwar or anti-neoliberal protests, merits a new category.

The typology delineated in this paper effectively subsumes the existing definitions of anti-Americanism by distinguishing between fundamental and policy-level manifestations. At the same time, our multilevel definition of anti-Americanism improves the existing definitions by comprehensively including both domestic and global levels. It highlights local circumstances where military bases are frequently the main sites of conflict as well as the global public sphere where American-led globalism is being challenged and contested.

Using our new typology intended to capture the evolving complexity and multidimensionality of anti-Americanism, we will analyze how anti-Americanism has evolved in South Korea in the wake of the democratic transition of 1987. Before we probe post-transitional developments, we will examine the historical origins of anti-Americanism in South Korea.

III. The Historical Origins of Anti-Americanism

In the 1950s, there existed no discernable anti-American movements in South Korea. Most South Koreans felt indebted to America for participating in the Korean War (1950-53), sacrificing the lives of American soldiers, and preventing South Korea from falling into the hands of the North Korean communists. The deep sense of gratitude continued through the period of postwar recovery in the 1950s. South Korea received and benefited from significant military and economic grants and aid—as well as political and technical advice—from the United States. U.S. support was deemed essential for South Korea's recovery from the devastation of war.

The first wave of anti-American movements occurred in 1960. As soon as Syngman Rhee's despotic and corrupt regime was ousted by the April Uprising by students, journalists, and urban intellectuals, discussion on national unification began in earnest. Profoundly encouraged and inspired by the power of the people demonstrated in the democracy movement to overthrow Syngman Rhee, many movement leaders and activists soon arrived at the conclusion that the nation's next objective should be unification between the two Koreas. The first anti-American demonstration took place in February 1961 when student movement groups waged a national campaign to oppose the Korea-U.S. Economic Agreement, asserting that the agreement would erode South Korea's sovereignty by allowing U.S. intervention into the South Korean government's economic and industrial policymaking processes. This was the first incident in which a popular movement in South Korea visibly switched focus from democracy to anti-Americanism/anti-imperialism.

But the abrupt eruption of anti-Americanism in 1960 was rather short-lived. The anti-American movement ceased following Park Chung-hee's military coup in May 1961, largely due to harsh suppression by the military government. Anti-Americanism was not a significant theme in the social movements of the 1960s. Considering that a strong wave of anti-Americanism in response to America's protracted involvement in the Vietnam War affected Europe and other regions

around the world (Revel 2003), it is noteworthy that South Korea was largely unaffected by the global wave of anti-Americanism at the time. There was civic mobilization against the Park administration's decision to send troops to Vietnam to support the United States, but it hardly escalated to a serious anti-American movement.

This situation did not change much in the 1970s. Anti-Americanism was not one of the major themes in South Korea's social movements throughout the decade. Far greater attention was paid to restoring democracy and ameliorating the plight of the poor. In particular, after Chun Tae-il, a textile worker in Seoul, burned himself to death in protest of the Park administration's growth-first policy and miserable labor conditions, social movements concentrated on issues such as civil liberties, political freedom, and labor rights. The United States was viewed rather favorably by movement activists and leaders due to the U.S. government's intervention to save the life of Kim Dae-jung, a major opposition politician at the time, and Track II non-governmental assistance to Korean pro-democracy movement groups (cf. Adesnik and Kim 2011).

It was after the 1980 Gwangju Democracy Movement that anti-Americanism emerged as an enduring theme in South Korea's social movements. In contrast to the preceding decades, anti-Americanism loomed as a prominent issue in the pro-democracy movement of the 1980s led by people's movement (*minjung undong*) groups (Henderson 1986). The anti-American movement in South Korea began to assume a strong and volatile character. Widespread public perception and suspicions that the United States had been involved in the consolidation of Chun Doo-hwan's authoritarian regime and the deadly suppression of the Gwangju Uprising fueled the dramatic shift of focus to anti-Americanism (Shin and Hwang 2003).

The U.S. government's ex post endorsement and support of a military coup in Korea was not entirely unprecedented. The United States had been in favor of Park Chung-hee's coup in 1961 that overthrew the democratically elected parliamentary government of Chang Myon. However, there was a notable difference between Park's military coup and Chun's: while the former was virtually bloodless, the

latter was not. Hundreds—even thousands, according to the accounts of participants and movement activists—of citizens were killed in Gwangju in May 1980. South Koreans suspected that the United States, rather than merely accepting Chun’s decision to suppress the protest, had been quite actively involved in the decision-making process. Resisting and opposing Chun’s authoritarian regime became inextricably associated with resenting and criticizing the United States, which came to be considered as Chun’s sponsor or senior collaborator. After the Gwangju Uprising, anti-Americanism became a vital component of South Korean social movements (Shin and Hwang 2003; Adesnik and Kim 2011). In the 1980s, U.S. government facilities in South Korea frequently became targets of high-profile attacks and occupation attempts by movement groups and organizations. The main demands of the protestors included a thorough investigation of the Gwangju Massacre, punishment of those involved, and clarification of the U.S. role in the bloody suppression.

In the 1980s, therefore, the pro-democracy movement became closely entwined with the anti-American movement. The pro-democracy movement at the time was mainly focused on resisting dictatorship in order to restore democratic institutions and civil liberties. But movement leaders widely presumed that their fight against Chun’s military and later semi-military regime would not be effective without discrediting and assailing what they regarded as his ultimate backers, the United States and its “imperialism.” According to many South Korean movement activists in the 1980s, the United States was an imperialist power concerned with expanding its economic interests and political clout in East Asia with little concern about human rights and democracy in South Korea, as clearly exemplified in the Gwangju Massacre. A series of prominent anti-American incidents took place in the 1980s, including arson at the Gwangju U.S. Cultural Center in 1980 and the Busan U.S. Cultural Center in 1982, protests against then U.S. President Reagan’s state visit to South Korea in 1983, and occupations of the Seoul U.S. Cultural Center in 1985 and the Gwangju U.S. Cultural Center in 1985.

In summary, South Koreans’ deep-seated suspicion about U.S.


involvement in the Gwangju Massacre and the subsequent consolidation of Chun's authoritarian regime made the democracy and anti-American movements collaborate very closely. Movement groups repeatedly used anti-American themes to enhance and fortify the legitimacy and appeal of the pro-democracy movement. Gwangju represented the beginning of the enduring cooperation of the democracy movement and the anti-American movement in South Korea. The multiple and significant contributions of American civic and religious groups to the anti-Yusin pro-democracy movement in the 1970s and South Korea's eventual transition to democracy in 1987 could not outweigh the South Korean people's sense of betrayal and suspicion about U.S. involvement in Gwangju (Adesnik and Kim 2011).

IV. Evolution of the Anti-American Movement after Democratization

To examine the patterns and trends of anti-American protests in South Korea in the post-transitional period, we use a recently compiled database called the Protest Event Data Archive in Korea (PEDAK). PEDAK is a database constructed of 7,432 protest events that took place and were reported in newspapers between 1988 and 2007 in South Korea. Data are drawn from two daily newspapers (*JoongAng Ilbo* and *Hankyoreh*) and two weekly magazines (*Chosun Weekly* and *Sisa Journal*). All protest events covered and reported in the four selected media sources were collected and coded by trained coders according to a preset data collection protocol. PEDAK's data include 1) number of protests per year; 2) duration, scope, type, and location of protest event; 3) sociovocational category of protest participants; 4) forms of organizations leading or sponsoring protest actions; 5) general and specific protest strategies; 6) types and content of protest goals, demands, grievances, and demands; 7) targets of protest actions; and 8) reactions to protest actions.²

2. For a more detailed description, see S. Kim (2009, 9-10).

Figure 1 shows the overall trend in the number of anti-American protests per year during 1987-2007. There have been five big and small peaks of anti-Americanism in South Korea's post-transitional period in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2004, and 2006.



Source: Protest Event Data Archive in Korea.


Figure 1. Number of anti-American protests, 1987-2007

These five peaks all represent high tides of anti-Americanism. Upon a closer look, however, there are noticeable differences between them. As figure 2 demonstrates, the specific composition of the anti-American movement, i.e., the relative proportion of each type of anti-Americanism, has considerably changed over the years. Type A (essential) anti-Americanism amounted to almost 60% of all anti-American protests in 1988 and almost 80% in 1995. However, it has precipitously decreased since 2000, recording 10.6% in 2002, 2.56% in 2004, and 6.25% in 2006.

By contrast, type B (policy-level) anti-Americanism has noticeably increased since 2000. From 9.3% of all anti-American protests in 1988, it increased to 24.2% in 2002 and 43.6% in 2004, although rates dropped to 31.3% in 2006. Type C (base-related) anti-Americanism has increased similarly over the same period. Base-related protests increased from 10.1% in 1988 to 18.4% in 1995 and account-

ed for a majority of anti-American protests (62.1%) in 2002. It outnumbered essential anti-American protests in 2004 and in 2006, recording 21.8% and 12.5% respectively. Lastly, type D (global) anti-Americanism has been on the rise in recent years, recording 32.05% in 2004 and 50% in 2006.

Essential anti-Americanism is limited in terms of its potential to be combined with other social movements. It was traditionally combined with anti-authoritarian/pro-democracy movements or the unification movement in the early 1960s and late 1980s. But in the post-transitional period, both democracy and unification lost popular appeal as movement goals. In comparison, the other three types of anti-Americanism can be relatively easily combined with other social movements. For example, both policy-level and base-related anti-Americanism have been frequently combined with the environmental movement and the antiwar/peace movement. Similarly, global anti-Americanism also tends to occur in conjunction with other social



Source: Protest Event Data Archive in Korea.

* Percentages represent the proportion of each type of anti-Americanism relative to the total number of anti-American protests in that year.

Figure 2. Changing patterns of anti-Americanism, 1988-2006

movements such as the peasants' movement and labor movement. The steady decrease of essential anti-Americanism and increase of the other three types of anti-Americanism indicate that the role of anti-Americanism as a main tool for achieving democracy or unification has declined, and that its role as a useful coalition partner for other new social movements in other sectors has become more crucial.

Nearly 60% of the anti-American protests were type A in 1988. The anti-American movement in that year revolved around three main issues. The first was the demand for official investigation into the Gwangju Massacre and the United States' suspected support for the decisions made by Chun's military government. Examples include an arson incident at the U.S. Cultural Center in Gwangju in August 1988 and incidents in which demonstrators threw fire bombs at U.S. military bases and buildings (*JoongAng Ilbo*, May 20, 1988, May 28, 1988; *Hankyoreh*, May 20, 1988, May 28, 1988).

The second issue was unification. Protestors demanded that the armistice treaty be replaced with a new peace treaty, and called for withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Slogans emphasizing the importance of the Korean national identity over alliance with the "Yankees" were shouted during the protests (*JoongAng Ilbo*, May 17, 1988, May 26, 1988; *Hankyoreh*, May 17, 1988, May 26, 1988). The movement clearly demonstrated that South Korea was "caught between two conflicting identities: the alliance identity that sees the United States as a friendly provider and the nationalist identity that pits Korean identity against the United States" (Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson 2004, 169).

The last issue was the import of agricultural products and American films to the South Korean market. Various social groups such as labor unions, civil society groups, and agricultural organizations waged movements to boycott American products, opposing the opening of the South Korean market and calling for the government to protect domestic industries (*JoongAng Ilbo*, January 8, 1988, February 3, 1988, May 27, 1988).

In 1995, anti-Americanism gained additional momentum. When the Public Prosecutors' Office announced in July 1995 that the gov-

ernment would not prosecute those who had exercised violence in the 1980 Gwangju Massacre, massive demonstrations ensued. The public was very disappointed to realize that even the democratically elected and civilian-oriented Kim Young-sam administration was not able to punish the authoritarian leaders who had been involved in the deadly suppression of the democracy movement in Gwangju. Immediately after the government's announcement, 150 or so civil society groups created an alliance and waged nationwide demonstrations, reproaching the South Korean government, demanding the punishment of those involved in the killing, and criticizing the United States for supporting the suppression (*Hankyoreh*, January 27, 1995, July 8, 1995; *JoongAng Ilbo*, July 8, 1995; *Chosun Weekly*, July 8, 1995; *Sisa Journal*, July 8, 1995). Newspaper reports on the crimes perpetrated by U.S. soldiers in the latter half of 1994 further worsened the public perception of the United States and intensified anti-Americanism (*Hankyoreh*, November 5, 1994; *JoongAng Ilbo*, November 5, 1994; *Sisa Journal*, November 5, 1994). The Kim Young-sam government ultimately succumbed to the strong wave of anti-government and anti-American protests, putting both Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo in prison and prosecuting many other former military leaders involved in the massacre.

The anti-American movement reached another critical juncture in the summer of 2002 when two middle school girls were killed in a U.S. military armor vehicle accident. Online and offline discussions of the incident, focusing on the U.S. government's recalcitrance in refusing to make a prompt public apology, greatly expanded and diffused anti-Americanism among citizens (*Hankyoreh*, June 29, 2002, October 2, 2002, November 19, 2002; *JoongAng Ilbo*, August 6, 2002, October 2, 2002, November 19, 2002). Younger South Koreans, relatively free from Cold War legacies and unaware of the multidimensional contributions the United States made to South Korea's economic and political development during the postwar period, more decisively asserted South Korea's "sovereignty" vis-à-vis the United States. These youth witnessed a period of dramatically improved South-North relations, took for granted the open and free political

system and civil society, and were skilled in using the Internet and communication technologies. The high tide of anti-Americanism in 2002 ultimately contributed to Roh Moo-hyun's victory in the presidential elections in December of the same year. Roh had never visited the United States and looked more independent from U.S. influence as compared to his opponent (Glosserman 2003; T. Kim 2004; Yi 2004).

The tide of anti-Americanism in the post-transitional era reached another peak in 2004 when the Roh Moo-hyun administration decided to deploy South Korean soldiers to aid U.S. troops in Iraq. More than 350 civil society organizations led the movement to oppose the American war in Iraq and South Korea's involvement in it (*Hankyoreh*, June 22, 2004; *JoongAng Ilbo*, June 22, 2004, June 25, 2004). The resultant anti-American movement that took place from June to August, 2004, was characterized by its extensive and popular nature. The anti-American movement at the time emphasized antiwar slogans as well as calls for independent inter-Korean cooperation and collaboration. The movement involved ordinary citizens, workers, farmers, and youngsters. The campaign against the dispatch of Korean soldiers to Iraq developed into a broader antiwar and anti-American movement, joined by a variety of other movement groups. Various slogans such as "Bush is No. 1 terrorist!" and "Is this how America runs its democracy?" were shouted in protests and demonstrations (*Hankyoreh*, January 1, 2004; *JoongAng Ilbo*, January 1, 2004).

The 2004 anti-American/antiwar movement was later combined with and succeeded by the movement against the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Roh Moo-hyun, whose election to the South Korean presidency greatly benefited from the high tide of anti-Americanism in 2002, suddenly announced the government's plans to negotiate an FTA with the United States. The announcement estranged Roh's supporters and caused a national controversy. Peasant movement organizations that opposed the opening of the South Korean agricultural market joined the anti-KORUS FTA movement, along with trade unions and progressive parties such as the Korea Democratic Labor Party, which had been waging an anti-globaliza-

tion movement since the late 1990s. Slogans such as "We oppose rice market opening and will protect our food sovereignty to death!" and "Priority to peoples' food sovereignty!" were shouted (*Hankyoreh*, February 15, 2003). Additionally, residents of Pyeongtaek and Maehyang-ri were active in base-related anti-American movements opposing the expansion of military bases and facilities in Pyeongtaek. Their slogans included "The U.S. Army must apologize for 60 years of obstructing Pyeongtaek's development!" "Put down the gun!" and "Right to life must be ensured!" (*Hankyoreh*, January 20, 2004; *Chosun Weekly*, January 20, 2004).

The anti-American movement experienced another peak, albeit less pronounced, in 2006 following the KORUS FTA. The Korean Alliance against KORUS FTA (KoA), an alliance of 282 trade unions, political parties, peasant organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and social movement organizations, was established in March 2006 (*JoongAng Ilbo*, March 4, 2006; *Hankyoreh*, March 4, 2006; *Chosun Weekly*, March 4, 2006; *Sisa Journal*, March 4, 2006). The organization dispatched 40 people to Washington, DC, in June and 70 people to Seattle in September to wage anti-KORUS FTA protests. KoA also led a series of massive street demonstrations in Seoul and other major cities in South Korea. Approximately 27,000 people participated in the protest in Seoul organized on July 12, 2006 (*Hankyoreh*, July 13, 2006), and close to 73,700 people participated in protests in 13 major cities and towns in South Korea on November 22, 2006 (*JoongAng Ilbo*, November 25, 2006). Considering that mobilization has become more difficult in South Korea after democratization, these massive demonstrations against KORUS FTA were of noteworthy scale.

Both the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations contributed to the revival of the anti-American movement, albeit for different reasons. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, government policies, such as the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, greatly changed the image of North Korea to the South Korean public, improved South-North relations, and increased chances of peace-building on the peninsula, which led to popular belief that U.S. bel-

ligerence toward North Korea was the major hurdle to inter-Korean reconciliation and unification. The Roh administration, by contrast, maintained South Korea's traditional alliance with the United States in both military and economic terms by sending troops to Iraq and pursuing an FTA. These two policy measures, in 2004 and in 2006, respectively, resulted in high levels of anti-Americanism. The anti-American movement during the Kim Dae-jung administration was a result of the public's appreciation of positive progress in inter-Korean relations, while the anti-American movement during Roh's presidency was an expression of the public's perception of betrayal by the Roh administration, who fell prey to U.S.-dependent policies despite popular belief.

V. The Co-Evolution of New Social Movements and Anti-American Movement

Social movements in South Korea after the democratic transition in 1987 have undergone several crucial changes. First of all, massive mobilization of participants has become increasingly difficult. Unlike the authoritarian period when the target of movements, i.e. the corrupt and despotic general-turned-president, was relatively clear, it became more difficult to articulate the goals and targets of social movements in the post-transitional era. Also, many South Koreans became intolerant of the old ways of waging social movements such as the use of violence and illegal methods. These changes posed tremendous challenges to movement leaders, who were faced with the need to devise and implement more innovative strategies to effectively motivate and mobilize participants. Movement leaders actively explored themes of new social movements such as ecology, peace, and antinuclear issues, and employed different legal and peaceful methods.

Second, the transformed environment of social movements has resulted in the disintegration of the grand pro-democracy coalition and emergence of different movement camps. The *minjung undong*,

or "people's movement" camp, adhered to old ideals, issues, and methods. The *simin undong*, or "citizens' movement" camp, focused on new issues such as economic justice, the environment, and gender equality; it used peaceful and legal methods to advance its causes. The citizens' movement argued that South Koreans became interested in new issues and novel movement methods in response to the democratized polity, pluralized society, and market economy. The 1990s proved that groups in the citizens' movement camp were correct. Whereas the people's movement camp underwent serious crises and eventually became marginalized at the end of the 1990s, the citizens' movement camp proliferated in number, enjoyed increased influence in policymaking, and augmented their institutional presence in South Korean politics.


Lastly, mainly owing to the successful transformation of social movements led by the citizens' movement camp, social movements continued to play important roles in political and economic reform in the politics of democratic consolidation. Citizens' movement groups effectively focused on different reform issues through the 1990s such as economic justice, political participation, executive transparency, legislative accountability, and judiciary independence. They led political and economic reforms and increased the quality of South Korean democracy.

As examined in the previous section, anti-Americanism surged in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2004, and 2006. It is crucial to note that in these years, anti-Americanism concurred with the new social movements that emerged in the 1990s. Here, we analyze three examples of the new social movements that co-evolved with the anti-American movement: environmentalism, anti-globalization, and the antiwar/peace movement.³ First, anti-Americanism collaborated with the environ-

3. The term "co-evolution" presupposes the conceptual and empirical separability of the social movements modified by the term. In reality, however, the movements often shared a number of elements in terms of origin, cognitive framing, outlook, strategy, personnel, organization, and resources. Hence, if we divide movements of common elements and characteristics into separate ones, discussing their "co-evolution" may run the risk of being overly artificial and even tautological. With this

mental movement. As figure 3 indicates, anti-American protests and environmental protests showed common patterns in 1988-1989, 1995-1996, and 2002-2003. In 1988-1989, the collaboration of the anti-American and environmental movements was clear in the demonstrations against the shooting range in Maehyang-ri. Residents in Maehyang-ri called for reparations for damage caused by noise from the shooting range and protested restrictions placed on entering properties within the shooting range. In Seongnam, about 2,300 residents waged demonstrations against the planned construction of a golf course for U.S. soldiers, arguing that the construction would damage the environment in the area.

In 1995-1996, the environmental movement, which had grown significantly in the first half of the 1990s, closely collaborated with



Source: Protest Event Data Archive in Korea.

* Y-axis: number of protests.


Figure 3. Anti-American movement and environmental movement

risk acknowledged, we still think it useful to examine how the prism of anti-Americanism has affected and transformed issues and strategies in different sectors of the new social movements of South Korea.

the anti-American movement. Leaders of this collaborative campaign sent open letters to U.S. bases and the U.S. Embassy, demanding compensation for the environmental damage caused by U.S. bases, information about the results of the U.S. investigation into the status of environmental pollution related to those bases, inclusion of environment-related articles into the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and joint investigation of environmental contamination in base areas. In March 1997, environmental organizations and anti-American groups held joint demonstrations to criticize the U.S. forces in South Korea for keeping depleted uranium ammunition, which was believed to be potentially hazardous for the environment and health (*JoongAng Ilbo*, March 22, 1997; *Hankyoreh*, March 22, 1997; *Hankyoreh*, May 23, 1997; *JoongAng Ilbo*, August 17, 1997; *Hankyoreh*, March 21, 1998). In November 1999, anti-American organizations and environmental groups jointly campaigned the U.S. government to apologize and provide compensation for damage caused by the defoliant used by the U.S. military along the Demilitarized Zone in 1968-69 (*Hankyoreh*, November 20, 1999).

In February 2000, it was disclosed that poisonous liquids such as formaldehyde were dumped into sewage at U.S. bases in Seoul, which flowed into the Hangang river (*Hankyoreh*, February 19, 2000). In July of the same year, anti-American groups and environmental organizations collaborated to initiate a movement demanding punishment of the person in charge of the toxic dumping and the resignation of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in South Korea (*Hankyoreh*, July 15, 2000). This movement developed into a grand movement calling for revision of the SOFA in 2001-2002.

The anti-American movement also aligned with the anti-globalization movement. The South Korean anti-globalization movement took the form of anti-free trade movements. As figure 4 demonstrates, the anti-globalization movement closely coincided and concurred with the anti-American movement, with its peaks in 1988, 1994, 2002, 2004, and 2006. The peak years of anti-globalization almost exactly match those of anti-Americanism.



Source: Protest Event Data Archive in Korea.

* Y-axis: number of protests.

Figure 4. Anti-American movement and anti-globalization movement


In 1988, the anti-globalization movement focused on protesting U.S. agricultural imports. Slogans such as “Must we kill South Korean peasants in order to fatten American farmers?” (*JoongAng Ilbo*, January 8, 1988) or “We oppose the United States that imposes market opening!” (*JoongAng Ilbo*, February 15, 1988) were used by participating organizations. In May 1988, eight representative agricultural and dairy associations in South Korea held demonstrations and burned an effigy symbolizing “U.S. imperialism” (*JoongAng Ilbo*, May 27, 1988). In September 1988, seven demonstrations were organized to oppose the import of American movies, using slogans such as “Cultural invasion, economic invasion, out with American movies!” (*JoongAng Ilbo*, September 17, 1988; *Hankyoreh*, September 17, 1988).

In 1994, the main issue was the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. In November and December of 1994, massive peasant protests erupted. On December 7, more than 4,000 peasants from 42 towns participated in street demonstra-

tions against the National Assembly's planned ratification of the Uruguay Round. During these two months, police forces arrested and imprisoned 183 demonstrators.

In the new millennium, the anti-free trade movement evolved into the anti-neoliberal movement. The movement against neoliberalism expanded the range of participants to include workers. In 2003, 66,000 workers from 134 industrial plants in major cities went on strike, demanding termination of neoliberalism, free trade, and discriminatory actions against irregular workers (*JoongAng Ilbo*, June 26, 2003; *Hankyoreh*, June 26, 2003). In September 2003, members of the Korean Peasants' Association went to Cancun, Mexico, to stage anti-WTO protests, where a South Korean peasant stabbed himself to death (*JoongAng Ilbo*, September 15, 2003; *Hankyoreh*, September 15, 2003; *Chosun Weekly*, September 15, 2003). In 2004, the anti-globalization movement became both massive and violent. Big protests attended by more than 10,000 participants took place frequently, and the protest methods turned violent, including occupying streets or major buildings and burning the American flag (*JoongAng Ilbo*, April 22, 2004; *Hankyoreh*, April 22, 2004; *Chosun Weekly*, April 22, 2004; *Sisa Journal*, April 22, 2004). Demonstrations in 2006 focused on opposing the KORUS FTA and protecting the Korean movie and film industry from Hollywood movies (*Hankyoreh*, July 12, 2006; *Hankyoreh*, March 23, 2006; *Hankyoreh*, March 24, 2006).

The last social movement that closely cooperated and concurred with the anti-American movement is the antiwar/peace movement. As figure 5 shows, the antiwar/peace movement also fluctuated in a similar manner to the anti-American movement, with peaks in 1988, 1994, and 2003. In 1988, the antiwar/peace movement took the form of movements for the peaceful unification of the two Koreas. On July 4, 1988, 50 civil society organizations, many of whom included groups from the people's movement camp, organized peaceful street parades, supporting slogans such as "Antiwar, pro-peace" and "Anti-American, independent unification" (*JoongAng Ilbo*, July 5, 1988; *Hankyoreh*, July 5, 1988). In September 1988, civil society organizations sent open letters to the leaders of major powers of the Korean



Source: Protest Event Data Archive in Korea.

* Y-axis: number of protests.

Figure 5. Anti-American movement and antiwar/peace movement

peninsula, demanding a peaceful unification of Korea.

In 1994, the North Korean nuclear crisis received the greatest attention from anti-American movement associations. Protesters shouted slogans such as “The South Korean government must resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully!” and “We oppose confrontational diplomacy that jeopardizes peace!” (*Hankyoreh*, June 12, 1994). Various statements opposing military confrontation were released, and various campaigns were waged in support of peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict. Beginning in December 1994, “antinuclear” became a key term in the movement.

2003 saw the strongest wave of antiwar/antinuclear protests in South Korea. The big wave of anti-Americanism following the U.S. armored vehicle accident that killed two middle school girls escalated to protests against the crimes perpetrated by the larger U.S. Army personnel, the U.S. Army as a whole, and war. Civil society groups organized an antiwar protest on November 5, 2003, shouting slogans such as “We oppose war!” and “We love peace!” (*Hankyoreh*, March 12,

2003; *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 25, 2003; *Hankyoreh*, March 25, 2003). Protests against the South Korean government's decision to send troops to Iraq continued. Protest methods varied from peaceful art performances to violent clashes with the police. Often, antiwar/peace themes were incorporated into sectoral movements. For example, 20,000 union members of the Federation of Korea Trade Unions demonstrated to oppose the dispatch of South Korean soldiers to Iraq, to demand the end of the war, and to call for better labor conditions.

In sum, the anti-American movement has had collaborative and symbiotic relationships with other social movements in South Korea. Earlier attempts in the immediate aftermath of the democratic transition to translate the vitality of the democracy movement into a unification movement were not very successful. Rather, social movements prospered by distancing themselves from the old image of radical groups fighting the authoritarian regime and focusing on political reform, the deepening of democracy, and new social movement issues such as peace, the environment, and gender equality. Later, the anti-American movement was revived not as a stand-alone movement but as a partner to complement and galvanize other sectoral or thematic movements. Post-transitional dynamics of contention in South Korea compelled the transmutation of essential anti-Americanism to other types, and encouraged its collaboration with other new social movements such as environmentalism, anti-globalization, and the antiwar/peace movement.

Sociologists maintain that social movements engender as well as interact and coalesce with other movements (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Minkoff 1997). The case of South Korean social movements confirms this view. The anti-American movement in the post-transitional period has constantly interacted and collaborated with new social movements. It has played an important role in stimulating, invigorating, and reinforcing other social movements.⁴

4. Our data and analysis only show the frequencies, diachronic patterns and trends of protest events. We focus on demonstrating how different movements exhibit similar patterns. Admittedly, we fall short of discovering precise causal relationships among movements, which must be left to future studies.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we examined the origins and recent developments of the anti-American movement in South Korea, focusing on the post-transitional period since 1987. We have shown that the anti-American movement and other social movements have maintained an interdependent and mutually beneficial relationship in democratic South Korea. Social movements overcame relative decline in participation and crisis of mobilization in the post-transitional era due to the timely upsurges of anti-Americanism in 2002, 2004, and 2006. In turn, the anti-American movement was revitalized and strengthened by piggybacking on the pro-democracy movement in 1995 and the new social movements that emerged in South Korea after 2000.

Most importantly, the confluence and collaboration of the anti-American movement and other social movements have significantly changed the character of anti-American movement. The dramatically transformed social movement sphere in the post-democratic era led to the dominance of moderate citizens' movement groups over the radical people's movement groups, popularization of anti-Americanism, and diversification of movement themes. The anti-American movement, combined and fused with many other social movements, became more accessible and sophisticated. The movement is becoming still more open and internationalized, addressing global concerns and nurturing solidarity with domestic and international movements. The result of this transformation into a more moderate, nuanced, and sophisticated anti-American movement will likely dilute the image of the anti-American movement as a highly radical movement.

The anti-American movement in South Korea will continue to evolve and disperse into many different kinds of movements: the peace movement to overcome inter-Korean division, the anti-globalization movement to resolve social polarization, and the environmental movement to address the inadequacies of the developmentalist paradigm, to name but a few. The anti-American movement will constitute an important source of vitality in the new dynamics of contention in South Korea and could ultimately make great contributions

to the deepening of South Korean democracy.

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