

# *Eochongye* Social Capital in Jujeon-dong, Ulsan

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## **Abstract**

*A demand for empirical studies on the practical workings of social capital in Korean society is on the rise now that theoretical discussions on social capital have taken root to a certain extent. This paper examines the eochongye (rotating credit system of a fishing village) in Jujeon-dong, Ulsan as a case study in order to verify whether economic efficiency at the individual level harmonizes with—and does not contradict—social justice at the collective level through social capital. Questionnaires were used first to identify the existing type of social capital of the eochongye in Jujeon-dong, after which in-depth interviews were conducted to investigate how this type of social capital works there. Analysis of the questionnaires and in-depth interviews produced the following conclusion: “Philos relationship,” a type of social capital, exists widely and is actually practiced in the intersubjective life world of the Jujeon-dong eochongye where common-pool resources are shared. By way of preventing generalization of values, philos relationship resolves the dilemma of collective action while causing the problem of community. The main reason behind this is the collective memory of cultural trauma of the eochongye.*

**Keywords:** social capital, generalized reciprocity, common-pool resource, dilemma of collective action, *eochongye*, generalization of values, cultural trauma

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## Introduction

Polanyi (1945, 1957) has earlier classified three forms of integration: redistribution, reciprocity, and exchange. If redistribution is the concentration of goods toward the administrative center and reallocation to consumers at a later time, exchange is the determination of production quantity and distribution method based on a system of price-making market. In contrast, reciprocity is a form of integration that depends on moral obligation. Reciprocity has recently begun to receive attention from some scholars who have shown interest in “social capital”: they believe social capital (which has reciprocity as its central feature) might be an alternative to both market exchange and redistribution in resolving conflicts arising between an individual’s private interest and a community’s public goals (Putnam 1993; Lew 2002; Choi 2004).

There exist not a few theoretical discussions on social capital; however, only a few empirical research have been conducted on social capital at work in Korean society. This paper examines the *echongye* 漁村契 (rotating credit system of a fishing village) of Jujeon-dong, Ulsan as a case study in order to verify whether economic efficiency at the individual level harmonizes with—and does not contradict—social justice at the collective level through social capital. The village fishing ground is a “common-pool resource” (CPR) of Jujeon-dong *echongye*. Hardin (1968) claims there exists an irresolvable conflict in a CPR between individual interests and the justice of the collective whole, and that the only way to resolve this conflict is through capitalistic privatization or state control. In this sense, Jujeon-dong *echongye* would make a test case for this classical argument.

Today, the village fishing ground is cooperatively owned by an *echongye*, a CPR which belongs to everyone in the entire village who used to use and manage it before legal rights were given. CPR is similar to “public goods” in that it is difficult to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. However, CPR is different from “public goods” in that availability of goods for others decreases when someone uses it. Public goods suffers from “public

goods problem” of producing and supplying only a small amount because it does not have an incentive system to produce and resupply it. In the same manner, CPR may suffer from the “tragedy of commons,” in which the entire community is affected by scarcity of public goods when individuals abuse it to benefit themselves (Ostrom 1990).

Many fishing communities in Jeollanam-do and Gyeongsangnam-do provinces suffer from the “tragedy of commons” today (Ock 2004, 45-64). I would like to emphasize that the tragedy of commons can be successfully resolved only when a community in possession of CPR employs social capital to find a solution for the dilemma of collective action. The “resource system” of CPR should not only be preserved for later users but also be produced and supplied continuously. At the same time, “resource units” of available CPR should periodically/continuously benefit all users “fairly” (Ostrom 1990, 33). Attention should be paid here to the fact that “fairness” here is not mechanical fairness based on a utilitarian calculation. Even if the benefits received are somewhat unfair, it is enough that the CPR members widely accept its moral justness. Therefore, fair allocation of resource units belongs to the dimension of moral obligation. Such allocation does not merely stop at giving birth to social justice but also brings about economic efficiency at the level of the individual by creating long-term preservation and development of CPR. In this sense, existence of social capital, whose key element is reciprocity, is decisive in overcoming the tragedy of commons. This paper examines Jujeon-dong *echongye* based on this perspective.

## The Dilemma of Collective Action

Jujeon-dong *echongye* is one of the most successful *echongye*. It received the 1981 presidential citation and the 1994 presidential decoration; furthermore, it was designated as a model case of autonomous administrative communities in 2002. Jujeon-dong *echongye*, however, is faced with a typical situation in CPR (village fishing grounds) in

which the tragedy of commons may materialize because the entire community must shoulder the result of overfishing of individuals that serves their own individual interests. Efforts to maintain village fishing grounds not only prevent the village's resource system from exhausting resources and make sure the resources can be continuously reproduced, but they are also key to producing resource units that can be used continuously. As can be seen in the case study of village fishing grounds allocation of Chujado island, members of an *eochoongye* whose primary income is derived from the fishing industry actively participate in maintaining the village fishing grounds, whereas those whose income comes from deep sea fishing industry tend to participate relatively passively (Kim 2002, 33). There is no reason for Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* to be any different. There is the potential for selfish activities to increase individual income rather than preserve and develop CPR in the form of village fishing grounds. Breeding ground for shellfish is key to CPR. There is an incentive system for female divers to actively participate in managing the village fishing grounds because their main income is from the shellfish breeding grounds. However, the danger of exhausting not only resource units but also resource system exists due to individuals who misappropriate common resources by overharvesting abalone and other shellfish without notifying the *eochoongye*. Those whose income depends on coastal fishing industry may be relatively lax in participating in the maintenance of natural shellfish breeding grounds, in which all members of *eochoongye* participate, because their income is mostly from somewhere other than the natural shellfish breeding grounds. Furthermore, illegal fishing gear may be used to indiscriminately catch fish including immature specimens, thus depleting CPR. Of course, there is an institution established to prevent such occurrences. Daily earnings of female divers are institutionally regulated by the *eochoongye*, and the district office, a local governmental institution, strictly limits and regulates permissible fishing implements for those in the coastal fishing industry. Furthermore, *eochoongye* members receive a daily stipend to keep a close eye on this system and ensure its proper function. This is an attempt at resolving the dilemma of

collective action through neighborhood watch. However, since perfect vigilance cannot be achieved in reality due to a shortage in the labor force, the dilemma of collective action still remains. The very existence of *eochoongye* will be threatened by the tragedy of commons if this problem is not resolved; the same applies to income increase of the entire *eochoongye*.

The free-rider problem is at the heart of the tragedy of commons, just like the prisoner's dilemma and the logic of collective action. Ostrom states:

Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts of others. If all participants choose to free-ride, the collective benefit will not be produced. The temptation to free-ride, however, may dominate the decision process, and thus all will end up where no one wanted to be. Alternatively, some may provide while others free-ride, leading to less than the optimal level of provision of the collective benefit (1990, 6).

In the case of the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*, the structural condition for the potential problem of free riders exists in the dividend (collective benefit), which is part of the income from the village fishing grounds. There does exist a structural condition for the potential dilemma of collective action arising between female divers who benefit only from breeding grounds and those in the coastal fishing industry who benefit from both the breeding grounds and village fishing grounds. *Eochoongye* members who are not female divers may appear to be free riders to female divers because all *eochoongye* members receive equal dividend from the labor of female divers regardless of whether they actively participate in the management and use of breeding grounds or not. Others who may seem like they are getting a free ride are those who are actually not active in the fishing industry due to old age or side jobs, and yet receive equal dividend from the labor of female divers merely because they are members of the *eochoongye*. The free-rider problem exists in *eochoongye* because all of its members

are entitled to equal dividend regardless of their productive contribution. Of course, the general male *eochoongye* members insist they actively participate in planting spat through which they can claim to contribute toward production for the collective benefit. *Eochoongye* members with a license for politically compartmentalized village fishing grounds can claim that they contribute toward the production of collective benefit by paying the fee which forms part of the dividend. The aged who are no longer able to work in the fishing industry can avoid the issue of free riders by insisting that they have a history of contributing toward production for collective benefit in the past. *Eochoongye* members who cannot concentrate their efforts in the fishing industry due to their side jobs (almost 30 percent of the total *eochoongye* members in 2004) can also defend themselves by saying that there is no problem in receiving their dividend because they paid investment capital to the *eochoongye* when they joined. However, these refutations may not sound all that persuasive to the female divers who directly produce much of the dividend to be distributed immediately.

### Types of Social Capital and Its Working

This study starts with the basic premise that the successful shift in profits of the entire Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* comes from revitalization of social capital which solved the dilemma of collective action. There is a need, therefore, to understand the existing type of social capital and how it actually works in Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*. Questionnaires help us understand the type of social capital at work, and in-depth interviews help grasp how social capital actually works.

I have synthesized existing discussions that have up to now segregated trust and reciprocity, established three "affective networks," and crossed them with two social networks to categorize them into six ideal types of social capital as below in Table 1 (Choi 2004).

Surveys were devised to get an insight into what type of social capital among the six types mentioned above is actually at work in

Table 1. Types of Social Capital

		Affective networks		
		Generalized reciprocity/ background expectancy	Balanced reciprocity/ constitutive expectancy	Negative reciprocity/ distrust
Social networks	Strong ties	<i>Philos</i> relationship	<i>Gye</i>	Hobbes' state of nature
	Weak ties	<i>Yeongo jipdan</i>	Bridging group	Prisoner's dilemma

\*Cited from Choi (2004, 117).

Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*. Specifically, it is made to measure both the social network and the affective network (trust and reciprocity). A common questionnaire was originally created for this study to compare eight groups of social capital (*eochoongye*, hometown fellowship association, high school alumni association, NGO, church, apartment, market of daily employed workers, and extended family reunion). An analysis of the questionnaires reveals that the *eochoongye* contains relatively high reciprocity and trust, and strong ties in comparison with other groups. The social capital of Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* has strong ties in the social network and generalized reciprocity in the affective network and the powerful background expectancy related to it when compared to the other seven groups. This can be said to be a typical characteristic of the "*philos* relationship" according to Choi's classification (2004). If that is the case, then we may speculate that social capital as *philos* relationship increased the profit of the *eochoongye* through successful resolution of the dilemma of collective action, which struggles against economic efficiency on an individual level and social justice on the collective level. Generalized reciprocity/background expectation functioning inside strong social network may reduce the cost of surveillance, produce social cooperation, and decrease uncertainty through information sharing.

We must, however, go beyond these premises to specify how social network functions as *philos* relationship and what its effects are in the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*. Discussed in this chapter are two case studies of potential crises, the insight to which is gained through in-depth interviews. The two binary codes all interviewees share are hermeneutically constructed through discursive analysis of in-depth interviews; one is the code for institution (*eochoongye* as a whole) and the other for actors (members of *eochoongye*).

Table 2. The Binary Code for Institution

Sacred	Profane
Collective	Fractional
Self-autonomous	Dependent on the outside
Productive	Nonproductive
Fair	Unfair

Table 3. The Binary Code for Actors

Sacred	Profane
Community-oriented	Selfish
Cooperative	Noncooperative
Unifying	Chasing-dispute
Autonomous	Dependent

These common codes allow for a degree of intersubjectivity among members of *eochoongye* because they provide a relatively stable system for evaluating events and people (Jacobs 1996, 1242). Sharing common codes, however, does not guarantee that all members of *eochoongye* construct the same narrative accounts of events and persons. Actors typify from codes to events and persons while attribut-

ing moral qualities to them. Thus, we need to specify what kind of genres actors construct in order to account events and persons: “genre influences the expected outcome of a particular narrative construction by constructing a set of expectations for the hero and for the conclusion of the story” (Jacobs 1996, 1267). Romance, comedy, tragedy, and irony are the four narrative archetypes. Meanings and outcomes of particular events depend on interaction between events and their narrative understandings.

I chose two cases of potential crises in order to investigate this interaction. The first case study shows social capital as a *philos* relationship successfully resolving the dilemma of collective action as originally presumed. The second case study, on the other hand, reveals that social capital as a *philos* relationship goes beyond the positive attributes for resolving the dilemma of collective action and, instead, causes the “problem of community” by forcefully binding the actor’s actions with excessively generalized reciprocity.

#### *The Free-Rider Problem: The Issue of Dividend*

The first case study of potential crisis involves the issue of dividend. There are many people who receive equal dividend distribution just because they are members of *eochoongye*, even though they do not participate in the fishing industry (defined in the regulations as participating 60 days in a year). These can be broadly categorized into two groups: First is a group of people who are too old to participate in the fishing industry. The second is a group of people who have a second job aside from the fishing industry. Strictly speaking, they do not contribute much toward the common income of the *eochoongye*, but they take in a cut of the profit in the form of dividend. Therefore, if they are excluded from receiving their dividend, the dividend for other members would increase. Not only will the dividend increase, but the allotted number of rocks on which sea mustard is grown for each member may also increase. In spite of this, critical situations such as eliminating these nonactive members from the *eochoongye* do not arise.

From in-depth interviews, we know that female diver Kim F1<sup>1</sup> (leader of female divers), a widow who lives by herself, attempted several times to transform the issue of distribution of dividends into a “crisis” at the assembly of representatives. Through analysis of her story, we found that Kim F1 used “irony” as her primary narrative mode. The protagonist and/or the antagonist are all negative characters in irony, more so than the other common characters that appear. The protagonist is the leader of the *eochoongye*; he is an unfair person because he does not divide the dividend in a fair manner and is making the entire *eochoongye* nonproductive by not expelling nonproductive members from the *eochoongye*. Antagonists are not female divers but rather male members of the *eochoongye* and other members who do not participate in the fishing industry and as such are negatively perceived as being selfish onlookers. In irony, the narrator cannot help but keep a cynical distance from the protagonist and the antagonists, because they are such negative people. As attacks against irrational characters and irrational reality they make increase, there is a tendency for irony to contain a more sarcastic characteristic. In order for such ironic sarcasm to succeed, the narrator must advocate the interest of the entire community by overcoming her own. Thus, Kim F1 speaks of the productivity of the entire *eochoongye*, and not just female divers’ partisan interests.

Kim F1 uses as well “romance” in which the heroic protagonist is depicted as a member of the *eochoongye* and actually works alongside the female divers to be productive and to contribute to the entire community. Antiheroes, on the other hand, are those who have the title of being members of the *eochoongye* and receive dividends as such but do not actually participate in the fishing industry, especially members of the *eochoongye* who have unrelated jobs. They are described as selfish and unproductive from the viewpoint of the entire *eochoongye*. What is conspicuous here is that the code for the institution, not that for the actors, is used when evaluating other

1. F1 denotes the first female interviewee, F2 denotes the second female interviewee, and so on. M1 denotes the first male interviewee, etc.

members of the *eochoongye*. Because of the difficulty in directly criticizing each individual actor, the code for institution is borrowed for the purpose of criticizing these members. Nevertheless, Kim F1 does not give voice to the extreme opinion that the nonproductive members should be chased out of the membership, but only insists that the interest rate be adjusted more favorably for the female divers. Such a moderate opinion is voiced by Kim F1 because a background expectation has been established between her and other *eochoongye* members in that in addition to her status as an *eochoongye* member, she is also a member of the fishing village community whose people have a shared history and place. This causes her to moderate her tale away from extremism.

Kim M2’s case is different. He became an *eochoongye* member in 2000, having lived in the fishing village since 1994. He also uses “romance” like Kim F1, but he advocates from a more extreme position to eliminate free riders from the *eochoongye* and to make it completely centered on producers. He, in his romance, claims to want to follow the regulation of the *eochoongye* institution to the letter. He is able to voice this extreme opinion perhaps because he has not been able to completely internalize background expectations through living and sharing temporal and spatial community for an extended time. Kim M2, however, is not in a position to formally present such a claim; he merely mentions it occasionally at private gatherings.

As a result of in-depth interviews with other interviewees, we predicted Kim F1’s narratives of irony and romance would be disputed by that of most members of the *eochoongye*, including its leader. The heroic protagonist here becomes the *eochoongye* on the whole; it is sacred due to its entirety. On the other hand, the antagonist Kim F1 is depicted as a selfish troublemaker who threatens the unity of the community by exaggerating small problems. Hence, most of the *eochoongye* members faithfully follow the “romance” of ultimately overcoming conflicts no matter how much a few partisans such as Kim F1 disrupt the unity of the entire community. Some actually seemed to sympathize with Kim F1’s opinion during the in-depth interviews, but other *eochoongye* members did not appear to have a

favorable impression of her.

But even they cannot just continue to refute the claim that the *eochoongye* will move more efficiently if nonproductive members are eliminated. They thus use a “comedy” to overcome this dilemma. The protagonist and antagonists in a comedy are all average people who are not better than their environment. The protagonists here are the aged, the infirm, and *eochoongye* members who must eke out subsistence through side jobs. They are depicted as the weak that must be protected, as average people who are not better than their own environment.

Well, we can't make ends meet for our family with the products from our *eochoongye*, not even 50 percent. Those of us who have no education or job have no choice but to live here, but it is difficult for those younger to educate their children and manage a household from the income they receive as *eochoongye* members. It's not possible. So they have an office job and live with some help from a vocation (Yi M0).

In contrast, Kim F1 and Kim M2 are noticeable as comic characters, portrayed as foolish for totally forgetting that they themselves could, depending on circumstances, be kicked out of the *eochoongye* through the wrongful accusation of being nonproductive.

Interviewer: But from the most economic perspective, people who become even slightly problematic should all be cut out . . . by cutting them out, dividends received should gradually increase . . . . But everyone . . . .

Kim F2: But who would they be? I could be one of them. It could apply to any of us . . . .

Interviewer: Even then, the villagers . . . .

Kim F2: Because tomorrow I might . . . I might not be able to work next year, and even [if I can work] I may not be able to fulfill the required amount of work each year.

The hostile person in this comic world is not evil but foolish. The foolish person changes into the ridiculous when the act is repeated.

People were sympathetic when the productivity of *eochoongye* was first brought up, but the first reaction changed and ridicule takes sympathy's place when the issue is repeatedly brought up. Comedy presupposes a happy ending in which order is temporarily lost but later recovered, and during the process the foolish and the ridiculous

Table 4. Narratives that Create and Divert Crisis

Inter- viewees	Narrative form	Hero (Protagonist)	Discursive attribute of hero (Protagonist)	Antihero (Antagonist)	Discursive attribute of antihero
Kim F1	Irony	Leader of <i>eochoongye</i>	Unproductive, unfair	<i>Eochoongye</i> members who are not female divers and do not participate in the fishing industry	Selfish, indifferent
	Kim M2 Romance	<i>Eochoongye</i> members who are female divers and participate in the fishing industry	Productive, community- oriented	<i>Eochoongye</i> members who have side jobs and do not participate in the fishing industry	Selfish, unproductive
Other Inter- viewees	Romance	Entire <i>eochoongye</i>	Community- oriented	Kim F1	Selfish, causing dispute, dependent
	Comedy	<i>Eochoongye</i> members who are old and have side jobs	Weak, must be protected	Kim F1 Kim M2	Foolish, ridiculous

are not excluded but embraced. Such discursive attributes of the protagonist and antagonists are concepts that do not directly belong to the binary code although they later derive from it. Table 4 is a summary of what has been discussed thus far.

*Eochongye* members with opposing narratives to those offered by Kim F1 and Kim M2 prevailed because an issue was successfully raised but failed to develop into a “crisis.” The two sides may seem to tell contradicting stories on the surface, but the original material of the stories, the binary code, is the same. Nonetheless, narrative realities are constructed differently as the narratives used diversified depending on the process of the event. A question can be raised as to the use of irony by Kim F1, but a new community cannot be constructed out of it. Hence, Kim F1 transitions into a romantic narrative like Kim M2. The protagonists are not the *eochongye* members but rather only some of the female divers and actual laborers in the fishing industry. The rest of the *eochongye* members are considered non-heroes and excluded from the *eochongye* community. However, the protagonist is the entire *eochongye* in the romance narrative used by rest of the interviewees. In contrast, Kim F1 is the sole antagonist, who can also be overcome by the heroic *eochongye*. The only antagonists in the comedy are Kim F1 and Kim M2, and so the number of heroes here are relatively greater. Still, Kim F1 and Kim M2 are also depicted as being within the *eochongye* community and ultimately being reintegrated and becoming one with the community again. In the end, the narratives of the remainder of the interviewees won because they had a convincing justification of looking out for the entire community.

What would happen if the narratives used by Kim F1 and Kim M2 had prevailed and completely reconstructed the *eochongye* to be centered around the producers, and succeeded in excluding or marginalizing the unproductive members from the *eochongye*? Each member of the *eochongye* would probably benefit economically on an individual level if the *eochongye* emphasized the producers, but Jujeon village as a community could disintegrate. This would have a negative long-term influence on the *eochongye* itself. Most of the

*eochongye* in Jeollanam-do and Gyeongsangnam-do provinces where separation exists between *eochongye* and the community of fishing village are close to collapsing (Ock 2004). In the end, the reason that the issue of “free-riders” was resolved by the Jujeon-dong *eochongye* was because the generalized reciprocity puts the entire *eochongye* community first, including the socially weak. Moreover, there is a long-term expectation that *eochongye* as a generalized community will reimburse the individual member, perhaps not during their individually productive period but perhaps later when their participation is curtailed by age or circumstance. I received the impression that Kim F1 and Kim M2 also agreed with this idea, even when their personal narratives suggested their preference for other solutions.

#### *The Problem of Community: Safety Issues for Female Divers*

The safety of female divers while they gather marine products is constantly an issue. The *eochongye* tries not to permit diving in poor weather as much as possible due to this safety issue. Safety, however, cannot always be put to the forefront of concern because the contributions of female divers make up a large part of *eochongye* funds. Female divers have also become accustomed to dealing with these safety issues through a lifetime of diving, making them somewhat insensitive to their own need for safety. They attempt to dive as long as the weather is not overtly terrible because their income will decrease when they do not go out to sea due to concern for personal safety. Therefore, the interests of female divers and interests of the *eochongye* can reach some level of agreement and, unless circumstances are extreme, they persist in diving. They think they are not likely to get into an accident, but problems arise when an accident actually occurs. In such cases, there is no detailed regulation concerning who should bear responsibility, or through what processes problems should be resolved. Therefore, the entire *eochongye* is at risk of reaching a crisis point when accidents occur.

One incident occurred when a female diver, Oh F0 (67 years old) was swept away by the waves while gathering shellfish in early May



2004. Prior to this incident, Oh F0 went to the hospital frequently for treatment of minor illnesses and osteoporosis. When she was swept away by the waves while working, she did not have enough strength to swim ashore; she experienced temporary paralysis of the shoulders and arms at the time. She was rescued by a fishing boat, and the other stunned female divers rushed her to Ulsan University Hospital. Fortunately, this incident did not affect her health permanently, and she was released after five days. This incident seems simple at first glance, but it could potentially transform into a crisis point for the association.

An attempt was made to transform such an incident into a crisis by Kim F1, leader and representative of the female divers, as well as younger sister-in-law of Oh F0. This can be divided and examined in several stages: In the first stage, Kim F1 strongly suggested to the leader of the *eochoongye* that the *eochoongye* should reimburse Oh F0 for the hospital bills and other expenses. However, many *eochoongye* members, especially male members including Kang M0, the leader of the *eochoongye*, claimed that the *eochoongye* cannot be held economically responsible. Their reasoning was that the *eochoongye* cannot reimburse out-of-pocket hospital expenses because the *eochoongye* as a whole does not have hazard insurance. Moreover, the *eochoongye* should not be held responsible when Oh F0 is not a member; she did not become a member because her husband was already part of the organization. In contrast, Kim F1 contended that the *eochoongye* should be held liable for the accident as the employer because an employer would be responsible for an accident met by its employee, and the female diver was involved in an accident while working on a job approved by the *eochoongye*. She argued that whether the diver is an *eochoongye* member or not is irrelevant under those circumstances. Raising such a question had a tremendous effect, to the point where members called a special general meeting of the *eochoongye* on May 18, 2004. This is the second stage in which, in contrast to Kim F1's hope, a bill was passed to make future female divers sign a waiver stating that the individual will take full responsibility for any accident while working in the ocean. Kim F1 became angrier than before, and

attempted to take this issue outside of Jujeon-dong. In the third stage, she first submitted a petition at the district office but was disappointed by its passive response that was due to concern over possible conflicts. She then directly appealed to the deputy mayor of Ulsan City at the fourth stage, the end result of which was to have a specific hospital assigned where the female divers can get check-ups. In the fifth stage, female divers ended up enrolling in a women's organization in the city of Ulsan in order to resort to outside support, since they came to recall their bitter experiences of "being women" due to the community's continuous unfair treatment. But with Oh F0's recovery, issues such as the waiver became a moot point and everything returned to as it was before the incident in the sixth stage. In the end, the accident was forgotten and safety issues for female divers were not resolved.

From stages one to four, Kim F1 uses the narrative of tragedy to transform the events from a tragedy to crisis. The female divers are depicted here as heroines who contribute the most to the *eochoongye* but are resigned to unfairness in the system. In contrast, the antagonists are the leaders of the *eochoongye* and the district office, who avoid the issue of reimbursing the female diver for her accident through the excuse of there being no precedent for restitution. They are described as persons who cannot be broken and do not care about the injustices suffered by the female divers. These new meanings stem from the perception that the *eochoongye* is unfair and that *eochoongye* as a whole does not return proper benefits to the female divers who are devoted *eochoongye* members. The female divers have power because they actually contribute to the *eochoongye*, but they are tragically cut out of their fair share of compensation by the leader of *eochoongye* and the district office. The heroines of this tragedy bring disorder to the balance of natural laws, and the rigidity of natural laws is recovered through their defeat. Tragedy does not presuppose victory; its only goal is to give birth to tragic beauty by being defeated. Kim F1 transitions to romance when tragedy failed to have much effect. The antagonists are the leader and the male members of the *eochoongye*, and the district office, who are depicted as brazen and

without sympathy. This meaning is derived from the perception that they spare themselves for the sake of their own survival and interests, i.e., that they are noncommunal persons. On the other hand, the characteristics of the heroes, who consist of the deputy mayor, the director of the welfare department of the city of Ulsan, and the women’s organization in Ulsan, are acquired through semiotic opposition to the characteristics of the antagonists.

Last year I appealed to the deputy mayor of Ulsan City to hold a meeting because I felt the unfairness of it all. I also spoke with the director of the department of welfare at city hall. We do not have anywhere to complain when we suffer from decompression illness through working at sea. I said life is very hard and asked for help, and the response was, “Oh, Madam Chairwoman, you are betting with your life by working without breathing equipment under water when even people who have difficult jobs on land are given assistance.” All female divers received a health checkup last year. We can receive a checkup once a year . . . . The support took the form of an assigned hospital paid for by the courtesy of Ulsan City. . . . Ulsan City helped in that way. We did not know anything other than working at sea, but we enlisted in an organization for women in Ulsan City after we obtained a license, formed a corporation for our work, and are over 300 strong in number. Because our organization has many women members . . . . Not in the old days, but now in this age of women, we are getting a lot of help; we are told that women will be given assistance from all quarters for whatever women can do (Kim F1).

Since the characteristics of institutions and actors outside the *eochoongye* are not defined in a dichotomous symbolic system, they are derived from a later semiotic opposition to the antagonists. These characteristics turn out to be compassionate and community-oriented. But Kim F1’s romance narrative could not be particularly persuasive from the very beginning. The reason for this is that romance is the story of the winner, and not that of the defeated.

Kang M0, the leader of the *eochoongye*, and other male *eochoongye*

members use the narrative of “romance” all the time. Romance tends to be the narrative method of choice for the ruling group across space and time, being described as a journey in which the hero perceives the antagonist’s threat as an “adventure” rather than a serious threat against the entire *eochoongye* and dialectically overcomes the challenge of the threat. The hero is the *eochoongye* as a whole, and its basic character is community-oriented rather than chasing disputes, and self-autonomous rather than dependent on the outside. The antagonist, on the other hand, is Kim F1 who is depicted as causing a conflict with the potential to destroy the *eochoongye* community and attempting to resolve the issue outside of the community. This romance narrative leads to the conclusion that the entire community will be preserved by ultimately overcoming such difficulties. Table 5

Table 5. Narratives that Create and Divert Crisis

Inter- viewee	Narrative form	Hero (Protagonist)	Discursive attribute of hero	Antihero (Antagonist)	Discursive attribute of antihero
Kim F1	Tragedy	Female divers	Community- oriented	Leader of the <i>eochoongye</i> , district office	Fixed like the natural laws, unfair
	Romance	Deputy mayor and the director of the welfare department of Ulsan City as well as the organization for women in Ulsan	Semiotic opposition of the antagonist (very com- passionate, community- oriented)	Leader and the male members of the <i>eochoongye</i> , and the district office	Brazen, not community- oriented
Kang M0, male <i>eochoongye</i> members	Romance	Entire <i>eochoongye</i>	Unifying, self- autonomous	Kim F1	Causing dispute, hetero- nomous

is a summary of what has been discussed above.

For the moment, it appears that the romance narrative used by the leader of the *eochoongye* and the male members ultimately prevailed. Most of the interviewees were extremely shy when responding to questions about this incident. There was much difficulty in even getting Kim F1, who brought up the issue, to talk about it. Kim F1 spoke as if she was persuaded by the opposition's romance narrative, stating that she restrained herself for the good of the entire *eochoongye* when she could have spread this issue to the outside by informing a television broadcasting station.

The leader of the *eochoongye* was asked, "If there are around 80 female divers who work and who should be responsible when they are injured while working?" But the executives of the *eochoongye* claims the *eochoongye* is not concerned whether a female diver dies or lives . . . I was tempted to tell this story to the newspaper or television studio, but I don't do that (Kim F1).

In the end, there was no difference between before the accident and after. If the female diver who suffered the accident had died or some other major tangible evidence that could be seen or felt by all of the community, then the incident could have transitioned into a crisis. However, there was not much force because there was no such tangible evidence or results. Also, the issue could have been different if Oh F0 were a member of the *eochoongye*. The general impression, however, was that there was very little probability of a crisis actually occurring in light of the participants evident reluctance to even discuss "such a minor incident." How would the *eochoongye* as a whole handle a situation in which a crisis is successfully achieved in the case of another major incident? A new clause was added to the regulations on maintaining the village fishing grounds after this incident reading: "Casualties (injury and/or death) of those entering the village fishing grounds, including carelessness and physical shortcomings, are the responsibility of the *eochoongye*." An official document was created to make the safety of the female divers into a completely individual problem. However, this did not ultimately help resolve the

issue. The responsibility of the entire *eochoongye* was abandoned so that generalized reciprocity did not occur. Although Oh F0 is not an *eochoongye* member, in the case of Jujeon-dong village where the *eochoongye* and the fishing village community are seen as one, it is the duty of the community to look out for every one of its members regardless of whether s/he is an *eochoongye* member or not. The community's cohesiveness can be weakened when the entire community does not return the self-sacrificing support of its members. To rectify this, an addendum was given to the new clause as follows: "In the event of an injury, the injured may be compensated with the approval of the general assembly."

Why was this issue covered up by an ambiguous expression, "The injured member may be compensated"? Long suppressed issues dealing with the intersection of gender and power in the *eochoongye* finally came to the surface. The incident is not merely an instance of female divers complaining about the unfair reality of not properly receiving generalized reciprocity, despite having sacrificed themselves and "putting their lives on the line" on behalf of the entire *eochoongye* for decades. The *eochoongye* was exposed as being grounded on gendered power relations: an androcentric community rather than a genuine community with shared sacred values. However, villagers, including the interviewees and even Kim F1 who first raised the issue, consistently refuse to view the *eochoongye* as based on gendered power relations. If that were the case, the *eochoongye* could become entangled in a zero-sum game between male and female. This is not what Kim F1 wanted. Her primary goal was to recover the generalized reciprocity in case of crisis. Female divers had strong background expectations for the *eochoongye* to repay with generalized reciprocity, but it did not turn out the way they expected. Instead of an explicit account for this, only an ambiguous answer was given. Given this situation, there is still the question of whether generalized reciprocity and superiority of community good will be manifested or not. The initiative is now with the *eochoongye* as a whole, represented by its leader. If the *eochoongye* fails in this regard, then the *eochoongye* may be faced with serious division and disharmony, as has already

happened in many fishing communities of Jeollanam-do and Gyeongsangnam-do provinces.

### *Social Capital: Prevention of Generalization of Values*

Whether it is to resolve the dilemma of collective action or the cause of the problem of community, social capital working as *philos* relationship in Jujeon-dong's *eochoongye* is the same in that it prevents generalization of values. The fundamental reason that a potential crisis does not transition into a real crisis is because competing narratives share a common binary code, as can be seen in the two case studies mentioned above. The *eochoongye* members of Jujeon-dong actually succeeded in averting a crisis by turning this code into the narratives of romance and comedy. As a result, generalization of values has not yet arisen, and most violations were resolved in the manner of "All's well that ends well" so that they would not be turned into a "crisis."

Problems? well . . . . Turning them into an issue in such a small village as this . . . it doesn't look good to do that because the neighbors in our village would become alienated and relationship bad, and small errors can occur and sometimes such things happen; well, we can do that if a big problem occurs. Such small problems should simply be overlooked. Cover them up quietly (Jang M0).

Why is it so difficult for generalization of values to occur? This can be blamed on interpersonal ties, a characteristic of strong social network. This claim can be very convincing in the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* where the neighbors have not only shared close quarters for a long time, but also are interrelated.

In the case of the Jujeon fishing village, everyone grew up in the village since they were little, and they are all connected as relatives. Friend, cousin once removed, cousin twice removed, they are all related. Everyone knows everyone. We are all related by mar-

riage. That is why we do not particularly want to create a problem (Jang M0).

Humans are not merely passive beings who are completely coerced by social networks. A cultural explanation that transcends structural determinism is necessary. Thus, we must ask the following question: Do *philos* relationship always prevent generalization of values so those potential crises do not transition into actual crisis? Or, does this apply only to the *philos* relationship of the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*? As seen above, generalized reciprocity can promote or obstruct generalization of values. Which of the two would become dominant is not predetermined but path-dependent. At this point in time, let us focus on the collective memory of "cultural trauma" of past conflicts that arose during the establishment process of the *eochoongye*. "Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways" (Alexander 2004, 1). Based on this, the conflict that arose during the establishment of the *eochoongye* was serious enough to mark cultural trauma among the *eochoongye* community as a whole. This clearly shows up in the following interview with Kim M1.

Interviewer: You are satisfied. . . ? Then, there was no conflict in the past as a whole. . . ? And even if there were, that was in the beginning. . . ?

Kim M1: In the beginning. . . well, there was clearly a lot.

Interviewer: Like what?

Kim M1: There was a lot of complaint about. . . um. . . giving permission or not when people are qualified.

Interviewer: How was that issue resolved?

Kim M1: Well, people went through a screening process, and if they don't pass, they have to try harder next time.

Interviewer: Then, don't young people and villagers become disgruntled again? You see each other day in and day out, but if some get in and some don't, people get disgruntled, get

angry, and get into fight. . . .

Kim M1: A stone was used to hit someone's head and its skull.

Interviewer: Something that scary was done?

Kim M1: Of course.

What should be avoided at all costs in an *eochoongye* is conflict that could give rise to crisis. Traditional Durkheimians tend to focus on the renewal of solidarity to be had after a successful "experience" of a crisis, but the confusion and suffering which the members of the community would undergo during the process of crisis must not be overlooked. Would not it be better for solidarity to be maintained without undergoing crisis? Here is the reason why generalization of values does not occur that much in Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*: Fear of conflict itself is mainly due to cultural trauma, but in addition, attention should be paid to the history of exemplary management after the *eochoongye* was established. When asked if there was chaos in the management of the *eochoongye*, most of the interviewees claim that there was no chaos, and the evidence for their claim of no chaos is based on the tautology of Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* being a "model" *eochoongye*. "Cultural trauma" plays a negative role while being a "model" *eochoongye* plays a positive role in defining the identity of the *eochoongye*.

There is some burying going on among fellow villagers; there were a lot of quarreling and shouting 40-50 years ago, but it is no exaggeration to say that *eochoongye* members absolutely do not file a complaint against someone at fault or who has trespassed these days because *eochoongye* members protect themselves from the inside now . . . . That is how it became a model (Choi M0).

The significance of being "model" is regarded in the same light as resolving the tragedy of commons through receiving support from the state and compensation from outside businesses. The experience of receiving support and compensation as a result of preserving and developing CPR by sticking together is decisive in the meaning of "model." It can be perceived that the myth of being a sacred commu-

nity was formed while going through this process. From an official perspective, the primary goal of the *eochoongye* is economic, but an individual's economic calculation does not win over generalized reciprocity and surface to the fore. The public act of breaking with "a sacred community" goes against generalized reciprocity. People at this time equate themselves with "the entire community." There is no higher value than maintaining the entire community as one.

## Conclusion

This paper has examined the more or less theoretical and abstract discussions thus far on social capital in Korea by citing a specific case study. Questionnaires were used first to identify the existing types of social capital of the *eochoongye* in Jujeon-dong, after which in-depth interviews were conducted to investigate how social capital works there. The following is a brief summary:

1. Social capital in the form of *philos* relationship is present throughout and functions in the life-world of Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* in which CPR exists.
2. *Philos* relationship as social capital of the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* resolves the dilemma of collective action by preventing generalization of values on the one hand, and yet causes the problem of community.
3. The major reason that generalization of values is prevented in the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* is the existence of collective memory of cultural trauma.

The first claim is related to the unique characteristics of *eochoongye*. *Eochoongye* operates under the operating principle of village community wherein regional ties are strong because it preserves the characteristics of traditional village associations (*donggye* 洞契). Unlike agrarian villages, the characteristic of traditional village association has not deconstructed but continues to exist widely in fishing villages. That is mainly due to the visible existence of the CPR, i.e., the public fishing

grounds that the villagers have collective rights to use. The market principle of profit maximization cannot be relied on in this case because the fishing grounds are not private property. Because they are also not the property of the state, the state cannot totally manage or control them. The village fishing grounds as CPR can easily dry up and become polluted if not managed collectively. Hence, there is an inevitable need for social capital. At the same time, an *eochoongye* has the characteristics of an interest group in that it is purposefully organized to create a profitable business. Since the rules of the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives prepared the founding regulations for *eochoongye* in 1962, all *eochoongye* became interest groups through adoption of *eochoongye* statute and business plans. In short, an *eochoongye* has the characteristics of pursuing economic profits based on a mutually subjective life-world, which is grounded in long-term historical experience.

The second claim points out that the working principle of generalized reciprocity effects manifest dualistically in preventing generalization of values in the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*. In the first place, *philos* relationship successfully resolves not only the tragedy of commons but also the free-rider problem. The *eochoongye* was originally an organization centered on the actual producers in the fishing industry. In reality, however, even people who do not work or do not have the ability to work in the fishing industry are embraced and carried as members of the *eochoongye* once they become a member. If these people are eliminated from the *eochoongye* membership and the *eochoongye* is reconstructed as centered on the producers, these members would receive significant economic benefits. The total amount of usable funds would temporarily decrease due to the withdrawal of investment capital, but profit would increase for all *eochoongye* members from a long-term perspective because productivity would increase with dividends. Furthermore, the number of allocated rocks on which sea mustards grow, the actual source of most *eochoongye* members' actual income, would increase. However, this did not happen; dividends produced by the productive *eochoongye* members are being distributed evenly among *eochoongye* members and the rocks on

which sea mustards grow are being fairly allocated among the *eochoongye* members as well. This may be referred to as a function of social welfare to protect the socially weak. In addition to such positive effects, however, *philos* relationship gives rise to the problem of community that silences or excludes the minority. Even the act of raising justifiable questions on behalf of minority members is considered a challenge to the unity of the community and is silenced because generalized reciprocity is "too powerful." This can be viewed as the minority losing a power struggle, but they rely on this in part due to the minority's strong background expectation of someday receiving rewards for their self-sacrifice. As long as this expectation is not seriously destroyed, the problem of community will continue.

The third claim can be explained as follows: Generalized reciprocity can promote or prevent generalization of values, and the latter occurs in the case of the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye*. The main reason for this is the collective memory of "cultural trauma" of the rather severe experience of disputes and struggles at the time of establishing the *eochoongye*. Another reason is that such memory has been established as the myth of a sacred community as it became in sync with the historical experience of the Jujeon-dong *eochoongye* being declared as a model operation after its founding.

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