

China's Policy toward Korea during World War II
-Restoration of Power and the Korean Question-

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Abstract

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~~This is a study examines~~ China's policy goals in the broader framework of its foreign policy and in particular its relations with the United States, and focuses on China's policy on Korea during World War II, ~~looking at its policy goals in the broader framework of China's foreign policy and in particular its relations with the United States.~~ The KMT-Guomintang (GMT) government, publicly at least, supported Korean independence and its leading organization, the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) ~~at least publicly.~~ However, the Chinese did not recognize the KPG on the grounds that they had to avoid any possible dispute with the Soviet Union, and had to consider the positions of the Allies, especially on colonial issues. ~~On the other hand~~ In fact, the KMT-GMT government controlled the KPG by various means, ~~and. It~~ also conveyed ~~the information to the Allies detrimental to Korea.~~ This to the Allies and this Chinese "smear campaign" ~~certainly had a definite influenced negatively~~ influence on the Allies' attitudes towards the Korean question. ~~At the same time, On the other hand,~~ China and the United States did not always agree upon ~~the ways how~~ to solve Korean question. Korea was divided by the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the war. ~~But However, it does not necessarily mean that~~ China was not completely relieved of any responsibility for this division.

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Keywords

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China, United States, Soviet Union, Korean Provisional Government (KPG), ~~Kim~~ Kim Gu, Cho Soang So-ang, KMT Guomintang (GMT), Jiang Jieshi, Zhu Jiahua, guide, Cairo Conference, factionalism, independence, capability, smear campaign?

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1. Introduction

The significance of China's Korea policy during World War II has so far been underestimated or at best misinformed. This paper will examine China's wartime policy on Korea, looking at its significance and policy goals in the broader framework of China's foreign policy. It will consider how China cooperated with or confronted ~~with~~ the United States; how the ~~GKuomintang-uomintang (KMGMT)~~ government controlled, managed and used the Korean issue and particularly the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in ~~ChongqingZhongqing~~; and how all these elements exerted influence on the division of Korea. ___

The interests ~~which that the powers~~ The United States, Soviet Union, Britain and China ~~had had~~ in the Korean peninsula arose from ~~the its~~ geopolitical and strategic value ~~of the area. Paradoxically~~ At the same time, it was ~~this because of Korea's~~ strategic importance that ~~made~~ the United States was extremely reserved ~~in regarding~~ Korean affairs. The United States approached the ~~issue of Korea~~ issue based upon ~~thea~~ general principle according to, by which it was committed to establishing ~~had to establish~~ a postwar system of peace. The Korean peninsula was not essential for ~~the~~ U.S. interests, but its geopolitical and strategic value ~~could made it a potential source of make the area a seed of~~ international discord. The United States thus concluded that the Allies must control Korea for a certain period in the form of "trusteeship."

China largely had two ~~objectives~~ priorities. Taking into consideration that ~~Supposing that~~ the Korean peninsula was essential for its security, ~~the China's first priority was maximum objective should be~~ to restore the influence China had enjoyed in the peninsula ~~in the name of sovereign power~~ before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. The ~~minimum lesser priority objective was should be~~ to contain or eliminate the influence of hostile powers, especially that of the Soviet Union, in the region. Britain was not so interested ~~not so much~~ in ~~the value of~~ Korea's value, but ~~took was~~

~~particular~~ particularly wary of ~~heed so that~~ Korea might not make ~~becoming~~ an unfavorable precedent for future settlements involving British colonies. The Soviet Union was not ~~a party~~ immediately concerned ~~in this issue~~ with Korea, ~~since because~~ its participation ~~in in the World War II-war~~ was not decided until ~~right before~~ just before the end of the conflict. However, the other powers considered the Soviet advances a menace to the balance of power in the region.

It is here necessary to carefully review China's ~~Korea~~ policies ~~regarding Korea~~. The division ~~of the Korean peninsula~~ was decided ~~upon~~ under overwhelming U.S. and Soviet influence. Both China and Britain failed to wield enough influence on the Korean question, ~~overshadowed by the role played by the other two powers which occupied and divided the peninsula~~. Moreover, ~~Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea, looked to the KPG for the legitimacy of his government~~ ~~The and its constitution~~, ~~Koreans regarded the constitution~~ ~~of the Republic of Korea and its first president, Syngman Rhee, sought for the legitimacy of his government in the KPG,~~ ~~which had been regarded by the Koreans~~ as an expression of the people's will ~~following~~ unleashed during the March First ~~Independent Movement~~ ~~uprising~~, and ~~which had maintained a close relationship with the KMT~~ ~~GMT was closely connected to the KPG?~~ ~~China~~. These particular circumstances led to a certain misinformation on China's role in the liberation and independence of Korea. It is therefore essential to examine China's ~~Korea~~ policy ~~on Korea~~ during World War II, ~~if we are to~~ in order to understand the essence of the Korean question the Allies faced at the time.

2. Wartime Policies of the ~~KMT~~GMT Government and Korea

~~Suffering With~~ repeated defeats ~~in the war with~~ by Japan since 1937, the ~~KMT~~GMT government ~~had taken a~~took refuge in the western ~~a~~ hinterland of ~~Chongqing~~ Zhongqing (Chongqing 이 중국에서 쓰는 표준형으로 맞습니다 중경의 중이 무겁다는 의미일 때는 Zhong, 겹치다는 의미일 때는 Chong입니다). When the war in the Pacific broke out, China expected that its newly ~~found~~ ally, the United States, would help destroy Japan and eventually restore the status China had enjoyed in East Asia. The United States' ~~s approach was one of~~ ~~with the idea of~~ cooperation ~~of between~~ the four powers and the creation of the United Nations, ~~and also~~ considered

China ~~as a partner in the postwar settlement of Asian affairs in Asia. For this purpose,~~ China ~~should was to be given~~ ~~be give~~ the status of a great power and ~~with that status,~~ appropriate international responsibilities, ~~or a hence a~~ "police" role. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek ~~in Wades-Giles~~) expressed his trust and gratitude toward President Roosevelt, pledging to follow his leadership on diplomatic and political questions.¹

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In spite of China's reliance on the United States and their seemingly loyal and friendly wartime relations, the two powers did not always agree upon specifics. ~~For instance, on what terms China should was to China~~ recover its lost territories, ~~and how to define ? How should one define the~~ China's "police" role ~~that the United States allowed for China?~~ Similarly, although the United States had chosen China to be a partner in Korean affairs, ~~their the two powers greatly ideas disagreed about with the process and goals of of an independent Korean independence and the process concerned greatly differed.~~ The ~~KMT~~ government did not intend to remain satisfied with the limited role granted ~~to it~~ by the United States. ~~It was in this regard that~~ Thus, the "Korea policy" became a seed of discord in China's relationship with the United States and with the ~~Korean Provisional Government (KPG)~~ KPG.

~~When examining China's Korea policy, it is essential to It is not fair to consider examine China's Korea policy without considering~~ the circumstances the ~~KMT~~ government faced at the time. The ~~KMT~~ government unified China in 1928, but the unification was only in form. ~~As a result, its~~ nationwide control ~~was weakened both in administratively and militarily weak aspects.~~ Yet, in spite of these unfavorable elements, Jiang Jieshi and other ~~KMT~~ leaders ~~strove to cherished an ambition to regain the "Sinocentric" leadership for overlordship in Asia of Asia.~~ The promise of independence for Korea was in fact a ~~sort of~~ Chinese wartime pledge for Asiatic liberation and freedom.² ~~Although China repudiated the idea of "leadership of Asia" Asian leadership by due to the pressure of the pressure by~~ the United States, ~~and other neighboring countries, it remained to become a consistent current in the policy of the KMT government on other Asian countries, and on Korea in particular, Korea particular.~~

~~However~~ Above all, it was the Soviet ~~China~~ policy that the ~~KMT~~

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government most feared. As Clarence E. Gauss, the U.S. ambassador to ChongqingZhongqing (Chongqing), pointed out, the KMTFGMT leadership saw "a very serious threat to its power"—in potential postwar developments by Soviet initiatives, "a very serious threat to its power"—considering the Soviet Union's geographical closeness, expansionist tendencies and support for the CCP (Chinese Communist Party)full name 한번 알려주시기 바랍니다. If the Soviet Union should would venture to join the war and take further initiatives in defeating Japanese land forces, it was very likely to extend its influence to Korea and have a strong say about issues in the peninsula. It was likely that, for example, Most likely, anti-government groups and especially the Communists would takeing advantage of the weakness for of the KMTFGMT government and —anti-government groups and especially the Communists—would be allowed to control some areas, probably in the northwest and northeast of China, on a semi-autonomous basis.³ These prospects were of the gravest threat to Jiang and his is was the worst kind of nightmare that could happen to the party in power, especially to Jiang.⁴

China's Korea policy during the war can be understood in this regard. However, whatW—with the onset of war and what with—the confrontation with the CCP, it—China failed to implement its Korea policy as originally intendedintended. A positive outcome was that The good coming out of this evil was that this seemed to pardoned—China was relieved of any responsibility for the division of Korea. In 1992, when Beijing and Seoul normalized their diplomatic relationship, some insisted that this was tantamount to betraying Seoul's past benefactor, the KMTFGMT government now in Taiwan. Indeed, the KMTFGMT government asserted that since the establishment of the KPG in Shanghai in 1919, it had continuouslyyed supporting-supported the KPG-led Korean nationalist movement —for twenty-seven years.⁵ Individual memoirs of KMTFGMT figures as well as official records of the government are full of stories of this kind, indeed stressing the consistency of their support.⁶ The personal relationships and unofficial aspects of their support are particularly pointed out by the ChineseChinese particularly point out the personal relationships and unofficial aspects of their support.

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~~As Because~~ China ~~had been~~~~werewas~~ under ~~Japanese the~~ pressure ~~to~~ ~~of Japan which~~ constantly ~~demandd that the Chinese government~~ arrest "recalcitrant Koreans," open ~~official~~ support ~~on the governmental level~~ was impossible, but there were divergent channels of communication through the party and through military personnel who maintained personal relationships with these Koreans.⁷ However, ~~there is a difference between one must be able to distinguish~~ the causes and national interests of China ~~from in these~~ friendship ~~or and~~ simple good will of certain individuals in the government. Expression of support at the individual level ~~might be used~~~~could have been mere attempts only~~ to gloss over the unfavorable direction in which China was ~~leading taking~~ its Korea policy, or to mitigate adverse reaction by the Koreans. Under the circumstances, the domineering nature of the wartime policy and Chinese maneuvers to that end had a negative impact upon the settlement of the Korean question. In the final analysis, China must have ~~wanted~~ its share, if only implicitly, in the division of Korea.

~~First and foremost,~~ China never recognized the KPG although it believed that this Korean organization was the best choice for the ~~KMTGMT~~ government.⁸ The Chinese admitted that they were in a position to exert a considerable, if not deciding, influence on the discussion of the Korean question by the Allies. In April 1942, when ~~Chongqing ChongqingZhongqing~~ tried to recognize the KPG, the United States and Britain gave it a certain free hand out of respect for the intimate relationship between the two Asian countries. They even proposed to reexamine the matter and adjust their positions to that of China.⁹

The Chinese defended their ~~decision not to non~~ ~~recognize the KPGtion~~ on the grounds that they had to avoid any possible dispute with the Soviet Union and to consider the positions of the Allies, especially on colonial issues. This may sound convincing in terms of their wartime position vis-~~aa?~~-vis the other Allies. It was ~~presumable possible~~ that the Soviet Union ~~might use some~~ Korean groups ~~which that~~ it had trained and equipped in Siberia to control developments in the peninsula once it ~~should~~ officially entered the war against Japan. This was ~~tw hat worried~~ the United

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States' ~~primary concern regarding Korea the most in its Korea policy~~. Later, however, the Chinese ~~referred suggested to another~~ probability. If the Chinese government recognized the KPG and other Western powers followed ~~the Chinese~~ suit, the Soviet Union might encourage Koreans in Siberia to form another government. This would create a touch-and-go situation in Soviet relations. On the contrary, the Soviets might not insist ~~upon on~~ refusing recognition ~~to of~~ the KPG, ~~for because Koreans inside the peninsula this Korean organization had been received by it the Koreans inside the peninsula~~ as the legitimate government since its creation in 1919. China considered that the second ~~scenario~~ would be more likely to be the case if the two powers should disagree over the Korean question.¹⁰

~~Secondly, CChina~~ ~~also resisted recognition of the KPG based on the fact that there was a split even amongst suggested the split among the~~ Korean groups ~~as another reason for nonrecognition~~. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that the outstanding feature of the Korean anti-Japanese movement was its disunity. ~~– If SinceWhen~~ Korean factions ~~were able to attained~~ unity, the Chinese government ~~would then would wishwished to reconsider the question of recognition and consult with the United States government~~. The Korean leaders were summoned before Jiang Jieshi, who, according to one Korean informant, gave them what the Koreans term a "lecture on the need for unity."¹¹ It is undeniable that the KPG was only a paper government loaded with problems and ~~lack~~ ~~ing ined~~ concrete organization and precision of programs, thus demonstrating poor leadership in the Korean independence movement.¹² ~~Despite And yet all these issues,~~ the recognition of the KPG was essential for settling the Korean question in a progressive direction ~~for the Korean people~~. Solid leadership was one of the crucial elements in the establishment of an independent Korean state. Since political leadership ~~could was unable not possibly to grow develop~~ under Japan's rule, the ~~leading~~ powers naturally turned attention to Korean groups in exile. One study has succinctly pointed out that in no other country, ~~apparently,~~ ~~have~~ political ~~emigresémigrés~~ played as important a role as they did in

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Korea after the end of the war.¹³

It can be argued that if China had ~~been worked~~ favorably ~~towardse to~~ ~~theKorean~~ independence ~~of Korea~~, China only had to recognize the KPG and ~~help~~ ~~unite~~ all the Korean groups ~~be united~~ under its leadership. ~~It was not a difficult~~~~The~~ ~~task was not very difficult~~. As Foreign Minister Song Ziwen (T.-V. Soong) noted in his memorandum to President Roosevelt in April 1942, the Korean groups would have been easily united if they had international recognition or financial and military support. Yet China only highlighted how split the Koreans were and then ~~simply~~ looked away.

The Chinese attributed Koreans' factionalism to their national character, ~~saying~~ ~~that they which was said to~~ ~~lacked~~ a spirit of solidarity, a great leader, and a central theme ~~- an , i. e., a leading~~ ideology similar to the ~~KMT~~~~GMT~~'s Three People's Principles ~~- and that they were~~ ~~and to be~~ characterized by ~~a~~ deep-rooted, mutual distrust.¹⁴ ~~The struggle for leadership was essentially~~ ~~In terms of power, it was a~~ ~~confrontation~~ ~~of between conservatism versus reformism: Hanguk Dongnipdang~~ ~~(Korean Independence Party, Korean Independence Party~~ (KIP, and hence the KPG) and its Restoration Army (better known as the Korean Independence Army) versus the ~~Joseon Hyeongmyeongdang (Korean Revolutionary Party~~~~Korean Revolutionary Party~~, ~~(KRP)~~ and its Korean Volunteer Corps led by Kim Yak-san. ~~Or conservatism versus~~ ~~reformism~~.¹⁵ The split among ~~the~~ Koreans was alluded to not only by China but also by the United States and Britain. The Americans believed that the KPG was dominated by the moderate KIP and that the left-leaning KRP had a large following among Koreans in Manchuria.¹⁶ In Korean groups in the United States, the major, ~~most salient~~ ~~conflict~~ ~~struggle was the struggle for leadership of the Korean independence~~ ~~movement was between~~ Syngman Rhee (of the KPG or Korea Commission) ~~versus and~~ Haan (Han) ~~K~~~~il~~~~_~~~~su~~ (of the Sino-Korean Peoples' League, or KRP). ~~The most salient~~ ~~feature was the struggle for leadership of the Korean independence movement~~.¹⁷

Was "contention" a national characteristic of the Korean people? As a matter of

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course, personality studies or psychological approaches cannot form a general theory to answer this question, even if they do contribute to explaining certain aspects of social phenomena. ~~Yet, the~~ split among the Korean groups was fueled by the great powers, including China, who ~~were prone to~~ manipulated the weaker nations ~~when they felt it necessary as they saw fit~~.¹⁸ ~~At the same time,~~ China was ~~also~~ plagued with an ideological confrontation and split between the ~~KMT~~ KMT and the CCP. If the ~~KMT~~ KMT government sincerely desired the independence of Korea, there was no need for it to highlight the split among the Korean groups. Moreover, serious as this strife was, a considerable part of it was manipulated and exaggerated by China, and thus. ~~Then it was~~ conveyed to the Allies ~~in that magnified state~~. The Korean factional strife of Koreans was indeed manipulated for used to serve a purpose within China's Korea policy, a point recognized and stressed by Korean nationalists at the time ~~stressed this latter point~~. When Gauss asked in February 1942 whether the KPG had been recognized by the Chinese government, ~~Ch~~Jo So-ang, the foreign minister of the KPG, admitted that it had not, and "whisperingly" suggested that this was perhaps due to the desire of China to bring Korea under its suzerainty after the defeat of Japan.¹⁹ Frequently thereafter, Korean nationalists accused China of using the split among the Korean groups as a pretext for non-recognition of the KPG.²⁰

3. Restraints Imposed upon the KPG and the Independence Army

The ~~KMT~~ KMT government intensified intervention in and control of Korean groups in manifold ways. First and foremost, the "Guide for Activities of the Korean Independence Army" in November 1941 reflected ~~this idea~~ their involvement. ~~The~~ The guide stipulated, for example that ~~that the~~ while the KIA (독립군? Independence Army? Ok, so Korean Independence Army, KIA will be better) and the KPG were to answer solely and directly to the Military Affairs Commission of the ~~KMT~~ KMT government, and receive commands and military orders from this organ while fighting Japan on Chinese territory ~~were in China fighting Japan, they would be directly under the Military Affairs Commission of the KMT government, receiving commands and~~

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~~military orders solely from the highest organ of China, and not via other political interference.~~ (Article 1); ~~that t~~The KPG and the KIP were separate entities with no special relationship ~~.(Article 2); and that -p~~Prior to the termination of the war, when the Korean army and the KPG ~~would-will~~ have already pushed into Korean territory, the army ~~would-will~~ continue to take the orders of the Chinese Commission for coordinated warfare. (Article 9).²¹ The " Guide for Activities" was the best choice the ~~KMTFGMT~~ government had in late 1941 when the ~~KMTFGMT~~'s grip on power had weakened to a considerable extent ~~since-following~~ the outbreak of the war against Japan. Worse, the ~~CCP~~ was expanding the Red Army (renamed ~~to~~the Eighth Route Army according to the United Front agreement in 1937) in North China and challenging the ~~KMTFGMT~~'s authority by forming a "border government." The ~~KMTFGMT~~ government was afraid of "another Eighth Route Army problem" if it were to permit the organization of a Korean independence army on Chinese territory.²² Moreover, China referred to the KPG as the "KPG of the Korean Independence Party," ~~deflecting in a direction opposite to what the KPG hoped for. China~~ thus depriving the KPG of ~~thea~~ crucial means ~~in-to~~ competing with the other groups by separating the KIA from the KPG.

~~Second, t~~Next, the ~~KMTFGMT~~ did ~~not take any actionnothing~~ to foster the Korean army. Chinese records particularly stressed that the chief of staff and the head of the Political Section of the KIA should be Chinese, appointed by the Military Commission. In addition, the Chinese kept Korean commanders away from their troops so that no military movement might be carried on. ~~For example,~~ Vice-Commander-in-Chief ~~Kim-YaksanKim Yak-san~~ ~~had-wishedhoped~~ to join his forces in Xian, but ~~had-beenwas~~ prevented from ~~travellingtraveling~~ to that region by the Chinese authorities. This might be excusable in light of his Communist affiliation. However, Commander-in-Chief Yi Cheo²ng-ch²eon, who had been on extremely good terms with ~~KMTFGMT~~ officials, was also ~~bound~~ more or less permanently ~~in-to~~ ~~ChongqingZhongqing (Chongqing)~~.²³ It was the same sort of strategy that Cao Cao had used in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* ~~to~~ detain Liu Bei in his capital with

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seeming hospitality in order to prevent the creation of independent local military forces. Also, service in the army also was made not attractive as the trainees were not given sufficient rations and were routinely ordinarily went half-starved.²⁴ Consequently, the Koreans thus, became cynical as to whether the Chinese ever had any intention of really arming them or giving them a chance to do anything.²⁵

The Chinese used the Three People's Principles, or *sanmin zhuyi*, were as an ideological tool for the Chinese into controlling the Koreans in Chongqing (Chongqing). The KMTGMT wished wanted the KPG to subscribe to the *sanmin zhuyi* as the official political doctrine governing the Korean nationalistic movement. Broadly speaking, it was a statement of Sinocentrism, but in a narrower sense, the Three People's Principle purpose was intended to inculcate the Korean leaders and soldiers with Chinese political ideology so that the Koreans in China might not turn their backs on the KMTGMT. In a broader sense, it was certainly a statement of "Sinocentrism." In the first meeting with Kim Ku, Jiang Jieshi stressed that the Three People's Principles applied to all the peoples of Asia, and not just to the Chinese.²⁶ Chinese documents attest that the Koreans, including Kim Ku and Kim Yak-san, had received the Chinese principles without much difficulty. Yet according to American documents the KPG, according to American documents, while being prepared to permit individuals to subscribe to any political or religious doctrine they wished, and considered that the demand that the *sanmin zhuyi* be adopted as the official Korean platform as was out of order unreasonable. The Koreans decided to forego KMTGMT financial aid rather than to obey this edict and the question was held in abeyance.²⁷

Jiang Jieshi also employed another typical Chinese method to way in controlling the Korean forces, a method China had followed in the past, when the "Chinese way" refers to the old conventions of the Sinocentric past when China considered other neighboring political entities as barbarians in its peripheral areas.

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Jiang did not designate one ministry or one person to take charge of the Korean question but handpicked members for a triumvirate to oversee the KPG. This was personally decided by Jiang ~~personally, but personally~~ after several meetings with government leaders.²⁸ The three persons-members in the "triumvirate" were General He Yingqin, the chief of staff and minister of war, Zhu Jiahua, and Wu Tiejeng (~~Wu Techen~~), the secretary-general of the Central Executive Committee of the ~~KMTGMT~~ and the personal secretary of the Generalissimo. In addition, Shao Yulin, Jiang's senior secretary, was appointed at the request of ~~Kim Ku~~ Kim Gu as special advisor to the KPG. Shao was a leading specialist on Korean affairs within the ~~KMTGMT~~, and he personally maintained friendly relations with ~~Kim Ku~~ Kim Gu and other KPG officials.²⁹ ~~For Chongqing, this arrangement might have been necessary, as it should as it did~~ not give the Allies the impression that the Chinese government was inclined ~~to give~~ to diplomatically recognize ~~to~~ the KPG. This low-key strategy ~~was amply demonstrated~~ is evident in personal the way correspondence ~~was exchanged on a personal basis, in which members calling referred to~~ one another as "Elder Brother" instead of using official titles.

~~Yet the~~ This Chinese policy, however, caused difficulties for the KPG many difficulties. Among the three members of the triumvirate, Zhu Jiahua was the leading figure in handling Korean affairs in his capacity of chairman of a commission that oversaw frontier areas including Tibet and Mongolia and, in particular as was one of the directors of the Sino-Korean Cultural Association.³⁰ This ~~was the~~ indication that the ~~KMTGMT delegated the Korean question to an advocate of Sinocentrism, treating the Korean situation as the a matter as a~~ "frontier issues." The Koreans felt particularly indignant over such treatment. At the time, the contention between the ~~KMTGMT~~ government and the CCP did not mean only a power struggle in China. It was a war of ideology and world outlook about creating a new society. While the CCP formed a united front, championing equality of all peoples, the ~~KMTGMT~~ approached the Korean question with a sinocentric attitude, ~~in terms of Sinocentrism,~~ a

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paramount symbol of inequality, albeit advocating a benign Chinese leadership among Asian peoples.

~~Second,~~ Also, while each of the three persons in the aforementioned "triumvirate" ~~had some~~ was ~~responsibil~~ responsibility for the Korean issues, there was no coordination in the handling of these Korean problems. Indeed, the way in which Koreans were forced to deal with the triumvirate was ~~One~~ one of the factors in Korean "disunity ~~among the Koreans~~", ~~was the circumstances in which the Koreans were forced to deal with these three persons.~~³¹ According to John Service, one of the U.S. embassy staff, the three never ~~gathered met together~~ and never agreed ~~with each other~~ on anything. ~~Then~~ But each of them insisted that the KPG ~~should~~ deal only with ~~himself and himself only them~~. In the end, the KPG ~~could not help but fall~~ fell victim to the triumvirate's bickering ~~of the three~~. Chinesea's policy could not possibly maintain consistency in the circumstances. In April 1944, before the Congress of the KPG opened, Zhu Jiahua ~~Zhu~~ summoned Kim Ku ~~Kim Gu~~ and other Korean leaders and told them very curtly that he did not want to have any "Communists or leftists" in the KPG. This was a downright contradiction of what the Koreans had been told up to now by the Chinese government. ~~The~~ Koreans met and decided to refuse, if necessary, all financial aid from the KMT ~~GMT~~. At the Congress they ~~did~~ elected ~~some a few~~ left-wing representatives.³²

The KMT ~~GMT~~ government ~~also~~ disapproved of any contacts between the local Koreans and foreign embassies in Chongqing ~~Zhongqing~~.³³ The British armed forces in India and Burma were reported to have employed a few Koreans for translation of captured Japanese documents and questioning of Japanese prisoners. They had found the Koreans so useful that they were endeavoring to obtain the services of additional Koreans in China. Yet the Koreans stated that the Chinese placed all possible obstructions in their path.³⁴ In this way, China forced the KPG to manage foreign affairs only through the Chinese government, just as it had hindered any independent contact between Korea and other foreign countries in the 1880s.³⁵

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The KPG was well aware of the significance of China's Korea policy as well as its dual hypocritical attitude. Cho SoangJo So-ang said that the Chinese government's attitude towards the Korean independence movement could be divided roughly into three groups ~~on the basis of their attitude towards the Korean independence movement~~. ~~First, there was~~ the "diplomatic group," was which might be considered generally favorable to ~~accordance of~~ recognizing to the KPG. ~~Second, there was~~ The "military group," ~~which~~ was inclined to view Korea as China's "lifeline", and therefore wanted ~~the maintenanceto maintain~~ of Chinese interests there. ~~Third,~~ there is the political "Confucius-Mencius group" ~~which~~ viewed Korea as culturally closely allied to China ~~in terms of culture~~ and therefore suited suitable to be absorb amalgamated into modern Chinese cultural concepts.³⁶ Cho SoangJo So-ang believed that the Chinese diplomats were trying to recognize the KPG, but that while the its military were resisted ~~opposed~~.³⁷

The KPG ~~yet there was, however, had~~ no alternative for the KPG than other than ~~relying on~~ rely on China, since when the other powers were only perfunctory in dealing with the Korean question. However limited, China at least provided protection as well as financial and military support for the KPG. But, while admitting such dependency, the KPG was never off guard. In particular, the "Guide for Activities" had left a lingering suspicion among ~~the~~ Koreans, who, regardless their factional ~~affiliations,~~ affiliations were unanimous in questioning or criticizing ~~the the~~ intentions of China. Kim Ku ~~Kim Gu~~ reportedly lost much popular support he may have had in the KPG because of his alleged acceptance of those conditions.³⁸ Eventually, the Chinese realized the adverse effect of the "Guide for Activities" on ~~KMTGMT~~-KPG relations. Shao, Yulin later excused the Chinese control of the Korean army as "temporary," and the ~~KMTGMT~~ replaced it belatedly in February 1945 by a document called "Assistance to the Korean Restoration Army," which was acceptable to both sides.³⁹

Also in the background of Chinese influence on Korean affairs was general lack of intelligence on the part of its Korea's two Western Allies. The American government

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was well aware of the split and conflict among the Korean groups. Nonetheless, when the Korean question came up for a full discussion, the United States and Britain felt ~~the they lacked of~~ information on the subject, especially on the Korean groups in China, ~~the very groups that. These refugee groups~~ were likely to ~~become in be in~~ charge of postwar Korea, ~~and the majority of them were based in China.~~⁴⁰ China once again played a significant but ~~unperceived-unexpected~~ role in deciding the future of Korea. The American embassy in ~~Chongqing~~~~Zhongqing~~ did have direct contact with some members of the KPG. Yet its main informants were the Chinese and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the embassy tended to place more trust. In British records, there is no evidence that the British contacted ~~the~~ people from the KPG. And the Chinese took advantage of this opportunity. ~~T~~They delivered information that was favorable for China, ~~and interpreted this information to their benefit with such interpretation as they saw fit. For example, While t~~the Chinese criticized Japan's colonial policy, ~~but at the same time, they~~ also declared that the Koreans lacked competence for independence ~~since because~~ the Japanese trained them to be dependent. As KPG officials pointed out, this ~~Chinese interpretation~~ reflected ~~the how the Chinese were simply repeating the~~ subtle and vicious propaganda against the KPG which had been made by the Japanese in China ~~and now repeated by the Chinese.~~⁴¹ Of course, ~~one cannot attribute~~ the negative impression the Western powers had of Korea ~~cannot be attributed~~ only to Japanese's or ~~China's Chinese~~ propaganda. ~~Going further T back,~~ the image of governmental ~~incompetency~~~~incompetence in Korea~~ had been branded on many minds since the ~~time of the~~ late ~~Choson Joseon d~~ Dynasty. Yet just as Japan had misinformed the West about ~~the Korean nation~~~~Korea~~ since ~~the its~~ annexation, China engaged in exactly the same sort of "smear campaign" against the Korean people and their fight for independence in the 1940s.

~~Under such~~~~Because of China's intervention and restraints~~~~circumstances,~~ the KPG seriously considered moving its headquarters to the United States. ~~China's intervention and restraints served as one good reason.~~ Yet there was still a tangle of other elements

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involved. As the war began to ~~turn in favor of the~~ ~~present a favorable picture for the~~ Allies, the KPG ~~considered esteemed~~ ~~it~~ very important for the future of Korea and ~~the~~ ~~its~~ government ~~itself~~ to contribute to the war effort against Japan ~~as according to~~ the United States' ~~was demanding~~ ~~was~~ ~~expectations~~. Thus, ~~it~~ ~~was~~ proposed that the Koreans request support from the Lend-Lease funds, in order ~~that to obtain~~ proper financial backing ~~be obtained for the project~~ to put a Korean army into the field.⁴² ~~The~~ Chinese did not, at least outwardly, show any objection to the KPG plan. However, the United States correctly predicted that the Chinese authorities would not give the Koreans passports or other travel documents for such ~~a trip~~ ~~travel~~.⁴³ ~~The~~ ~~At this point,~~ ~~the~~ KPG ~~was~~ ~~became~~ ~~now~~ enraged at the Allies' inaction ~~in with~~ regard to ~~the~~ Korean cause. Some Koreans implied that, faced with Chinese obstruction and American and British indifference, ~~they might grow to feel that~~ Soviet Russia ~~might be~~ ~~was~~ their only hope ~~to turn to as a last resort~~.⁴⁴ Yet after the Cairo Conference, this issue was overshadowed by the whirlwind debate on the ~~phrase~~ "in due course," ~~phrase~~ and faded without ~~being~~ further ~~looked into~~ ~~reference~~.

4. Sino-American Cooperation and Confrontation in ~~the~~ Korea Policy

~~While~~ ~~The~~ United States, ~~even if it rather well~~ ~~was aware~~ ~~understood of~~ the developments between ~~the two parties~~ ~~Korea and China,~~ ~~it~~ refrained from taking ~~any~~ action. The American regarded ~~ed~~ ~~for~~ the KPG ~~had been~~ ~~as~~ thoroughly negative in the beginning but ~~slightly~~ changed ~~slightly~~ after 1943, when the leftist KRP joined the KPG by formally merging with the KIP. However, the United States turned down the Korean demand for Lend-Lease funds. Gauss told ~~Cho Soang~~ ~~Jo So-ang~~ that the U.S. aid to China was not sufficient for various reasons, including the lack of transportation facilities, and that the KPG must work with the knowledge and consent, at least tacitly, of the Chinese government.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the United States favorably accepted the ~~KMT~~ ~~GMT~~ policy toward the KPG. The Chinese government was, ~~of necessity~~ ~~necessarily~~ ~~and~~ "wisely," being very cautious ~~in with~~ regard to ~~the Koreans~~ ~~Korea~~,

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and pursuing a "watch wait and see" policy.⁴⁶

However, through continued contact with KPG officials, the United States came to realize ~~what~~ the actual significance of the Chinese measures ~~actually meant~~. The nine conditions in the "Guide for Activities" ~~were inhibiting~~ the Koreans' effective organization and activity ~~of the Koreans~~. Besides, according to these conditions, the Chinese government would continue to control the Korean army even after Korea regained independence.⁴⁷ The only aspect in which the U.S. contributed to the Korean movement was the State Department's ~~strongly favored favor of~~ the utilization of Koreans in their war efforts. ~~This is probably the only aspect in which the United States looked positively on the Korean movement.~~ However, ~~it the U.S. considered thought~~ that Korean resistance to Japan efforts to organize Korean groups for resistance to the Japanese had failed partly because of obstruction by the Chinese government, which apparently desired to keep the Korean independence movement under its control.⁴⁸ In April 1944, the United States concluded that a very real obstacle to Korean unity lay in the support and subsidies given to the two opposing factions by ~~the~~ different Chinese groups.⁴⁹ ~~and And~~ in June, it finally stated that Korean complaints were ~~in large measure~~ mostly justified.⁵⁰

The changes in U.S. attitudes ~~Such changes~~ had complex implications. As noted earlier, the United U States S. and China were not always in ~~unison~~ agreement over the Korean question, and this was primarily due to the difference in the definition of China's role in the postwar peace system. The Chinese attitude on the Korean question was further strengthened as the war ~~was approaching~~ its end and the "Soviet menace" ~~was looming~~ more clearly ~~over the horizon~~. If ~~only~~ Korea ~~should~~ would become a strong independent state after the war, ~~and and would resist never be used as a foothold for any foreign powers interference, all was well~~ China had nothing to worry about. Yet this hardly seemed ~~only~~ a ~~bare~~ possibility. ~~Thus~~ For this reason, China ~~should wanted~~ have complete control over the KPG while ~~having engaging in a~~

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broad range of policy alternatives. On the other hand, Washington was, according to Welles, "shocked" by the Chinese demand that its supremacy be guaranteed while the United States take part in the issue only to support China.⁵¹ Moreover, Britain and the Soviet Union were strongly opposed to the idea of granting China the status of a great power and accepting it as one of the Big Four. Indeed, the Korean question was becoming trapped in Sino-Soviet rivalry, with the United States caught in between.

Washington was determined ~~that it should to~~ avoid all ~~appearance of~~ unqualified diplomatic support of China, especially vis-à-vis Russia. U.S.-Soviet relations had to be crafted in consideration of the war against Germany and Japan along with designs for postwar settlements, while their relations in Asia were only a subordinate part of their overall relations. Therefore U.S. government ~~should was~~ not to be swayed by China in determining its policy toward Russia in Asia. In conclusion, China's Korea policy impeded the Soviet participation in the war and the United States had to give priority to its relationship with the Soviet Union.⁵²

The United States and Britain suppressed China's ambitions at the Cairo Conference. The Korean article of the conference was crucial primarily as a declaration of the general principle which had been discussed among the Allies from the early days of the Pacific War, and secondarily as an eventual U.S. restraint on China's desires. The Declaration stated that China, Britain and the United States would agreed to recognize Korean independence after the war.⁵³ According to Jiang Zieshi, Churchill did not like the idea of an independent and free Korea. He believed rather that it was sufficient to say that Japan must give up the control of Korea, lest the independence of Korea would encourage the people of Malaya, India and other British colonies to get similar ideas.⁵⁴ Other Chinese writings insisted that Britain was againstopposed the inclusion of the Korean clause in the Cairo Declaration. According to Shao Yulin, discussions were held before the conference to draft the declaration among the three powers, with the attendance of W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, and Wang Chonghui, the general secretary of the Supreme Defense

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Council of China. Cadogan proposed to eliminate any mention ~~about of~~ Korea, but China strongly insisted that the guarantee of Korean independence was essential for China and Asian countries because Japan's expansion to the continent had started with its annexation of the peninsula. Harriman also supported the Chinese position. In the end, according to ~~the~~ Chinese ~~viewsources~~, Churchill inserted the phrase "in due course" in the final ~~communiqué~~ ~~communiqué~~.⁵⁵

According to ~~an~~ official record of the conference in the *FRUS* series, Roosevelt ~~made a point~~ ~~pointed~~ to Jiang that ~~they it was crucial~~ ~~needed~~ to reach a mutual agreement ~~upon on~~ the status of Korea, Indochina, Thailand and other colonies. This implied that Roosevelt made it clear that the United States would prevent China's ambitions in the region. ~~In concurrence,~~ Jiang, ~~concurring,~~ stressed the necessity of granting independence to Korea. However, ~~after his conversation with Churchill,~~ Roosevelt, ~~after the conversation with Churchill,~~ concluded ~~that,~~ there was no doubt that China had "wide aspirations" which included the reoccupation of Manchuria and Korea.⁵⁶ Given that China caused ~~other powers~~ concern ~~for its from the other powers~~ ~~with its~~ ambitions in Southeast Asia, this conversation seems quite suggestive. Another record of a conversation among American officials including Roosevelt and General Stilwell gives more background on the atmosphere in which Korea was discussed. In Roosevelt's words:

He (Stalin) agreed with me about Korea and Indo-China. We should set up commissions to take charge of those countries for twenty-five years or so, till we get them on their feet. Just like the Philippines. I asked ~~I~~Chiang point-blank if he wanted Indo-China, and he said, "Under no circumstances!" Just like that --"Under no circumstances."⁵⁷

The State Department later commented: "To a limited extent, therefore, the influence of China as political spokesman for Asians seeking independence suffered from this

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commitment."⁵⁸ In the same context, the Chinese were hardly to act in the matter of the Korean recognition without prior consultation with the parties to that instrument.⁵⁹

The Korean reception of the Cairo Declaration was ~~not affirmative at~~ extremely negative. From late 1942, a year before the Cairo Declaration, rumors had it that a rumor had it that the Korean question was to be settled through the method of trusteeship. The KPG became all the more alert, relating the rumor to China's rule over Korea. It stressed "absolute independence" and refused any sort of mandatory control or subjugation. According to the American embassy in ChongqingZhongqing (Chongqing), such response was due to the fact that "the hypothetical mandatory power whom the Koreans had in mind was not a vanquished Japan, but a victorious China."⁶⁰ In early 1943, Cho SoangJo So-ang released a statement for publication in the Chinese press that criticized the idea of trusteeship. American officials in ChongqingZhongqing (Chongqing) acknowledged that while his criticism was ostensibly directed against the proposals put forth by American publications, his remarks should be taken as directed more particularly, though obliquely, toward China.⁶¹ When the official text of the Cairo Declaration was released, and the Koreans found came accrossacross the phrase "in due course," thea Korean meeting to celebratcelebration ofe- the Cairo Statement was finally canceled.⁶²

The differences of opinion between the United States and China seemed to disappear toward the close of the war. In reality, however, this was far from meaning indicating China's consent to the-U.S. policy. The Chinese position surfaced in early 1945 when the United States, Britain and China discussed a questionnaire on the Korean question. China welcomed this working level conference as an ABC (America-Britain-China) united front against the Soviet Union. The Chinese government delegated Shao Yulin, and Yang Yunzhu, the director of East Asian Affairs in the Foreign Ministry to this meeting,⁶³ and tThe Chinese Foreign Ministry prepared a draft. Yet as-since Jiang instructed that the draft should be presented only as an

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alternative to the American plan, it was not disclosed during the discussion. According to the two delegates, no matter which army entered Korea, the possible military administration ~~should~~ would be undertaken jointly by the three powers, China, the United States and Britain with the inclusion of the Soviet Union, if it entered the war against Japan. Joseph W. Ballantine, the head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, recorded that the Chinese side was very insistent on this view and insisted that Soviet influence in Korea ~~must~~ be reduced to the lowest possible degree with help from the United States.⁶⁴

Although the Chinese plan was pocketed ~~by these officials, their~~ China's intentions after the Cairo Conference ~~stand here revealed in full light and~~ make for interesting reading and greatly reveals their intention. Militarily, the clause "in due course" could mean a period of military occupation by the Allies, which, in the opinion of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, might last five years. According to the plan, While Chinese ground forces ~~would~~ were to assume the responsibility for maintaining domestic order in Korea, while the other Allies' air and naval forces ~~would~~ were to be deployed to defend Korea from external attacks. The advisory responsibilities would be divided among the Big Four, giving but give the lion's share to China in controlling Korean affairs. China would take charge of diplomatic and police affairs; the United States would guide financial and transportation affairs; Britain would assume judicial responsibilities; and the Soviet Union could help with the public health needs of the Korean government. The key in this solution would be the coexistence of a Korean government and an Allied military authority in Korea from the beginning of the occupation period. A provisional government in Korea in the occupation period could be no other but the KPG in ChongqingZhongqing (Chongqing). The ABC cooperation particularly put an emphasis on excluding the Soviet Union from the entire process.⁶⁵

China's fear of the "Soviet menace" now became the most decisive factor in its Korea policy. China was particularly afraid that ~~In particular,~~ the Korean Communists, having been trained in the Soviet Union, might gain a far greater chance of taking over power in Korea.⁶⁶ Song Ziwen, promoted to the post of prime minister in 1945,

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expressed his concerns in Moscow while negotiating the Sino-Soviet Treaty that under these conditions the Soviets might obtain domination of Korean affairs even with a four-power trusteeship.⁶⁷ The Soviet Union might establish a Czechoslovak style of government like that under President Eduard Benes ([Beneš](#)) or one like the Lublin government of Poland as a vehicle for Soviet influence. Moscow might find a number of candidates for the part of a "Manchurian Benes ([Beneš](#))."⁶⁸ Admitting that China might not have a complete hold on the Korean peninsula, the Chinese were inclined toward what seemed the second best alternative, the independence of Korea under the initiative of the KPG, supported by China and the United States.

This formed the background to the Chinese endorsement of Korean independence in the last stage of the war. By early 1945, China displayed ardent support for the KPG. In their talks at the Department of State, Chinese officials observed that the principal difference in the attitude of the Chinese and the American government toward the Korean leaders was that the former was taking more positive steps towards the guidance of such leaders and of the movement. Shao Yulin even stated, from his conversations with the Koreans in Washington, that most of them considered Rhee ~~was~~ too old, and [thought that he](#) lacked the necessary energy and initiative to pull the Koreans together and to cause them to make an effective contribution to the war effort.⁶⁹ The British were aware of China's change of attitude toward the KPG. They commented that such a plan would naturally strengthen the position of that government even without diplomatic recognition.⁷⁰

5. Conclusion: Liberation and the Change of China's KPG Policy

Chinese archives are full of reports on how the ~~KMT~~[KMT](#)~~GMT~~ government helped the Koreans' struggle for independence during the colonial period. However, [Chinese documents require particular attention and reading](#) ~~we have to pay a special attention in reading~~ "between the lines," ~~of their documents~~ [asto realize that China was they](#) ~~were~~ extremely concerned with ["saving face."](#) First of all, China insisted that, for all

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its efforts, it was impossible to recognize the KPG under the international circumstances of the times. Such failure resulted from the lukewarm or negative attitude of the United States and Britain and therefore China was not to bear the blame.

The Koreans in ~~ChongqingZhongqing~~ were even informed by the Chinese that it was Churchill who was responsible for ~~the phrase, "in due course," phrase.~~ The British, in turn, informed ~~the Koreans them_~~ that it was ~~due to~~ Chinese insistence that prompted the use of this phrase ~~was added.~~⁷¹

Undoubtedly, the ~~KMTGMT~~ policy toward Korea aimed primarily at China's return to the Korean peninsula, ~~in whatever form by whatever means it might take possible.~~ China's dream was frustrated ~~with by~~ the end of the war, and its government, one of the four trustees for Korea, was simply informed of the decision of the Moscow Conference by which the three others determined upon a trusteeship for Korea. ~~In return response,~~ China stated more in sorrow than in anger on 4 January 4, 1946, ~~more in sorrow than in anger~~ that a trusteeship would not be ~~necessary necessary,~~ as that would greatly complicate the Korean situation.⁷² This was how China's policy toward the KPG in due course unfolded.

Studying ~~the record documents of the times from that period~~ without a good understanding of China's position, ~~it would can be confusing, because it first supported be only a record of utter confusion. Once the Chinese support~~ independence, and ~~then~~ later ~~they~~ advocated trusteeship. According to a British record, the Chinese had few illusions as to the capability of the Koreans for self-government. Yet the Chinese government had been toying with the idea of recognition, encouraging the KPG to send periodical "trial balloons" from ~~ChongqingZhongqing~~ in the form of telegrams, letters and manifestos addressed to the Allied leaders.⁷³ It is indisputable that the ~~KMTGMT~~'s diplomacy, even if it partially resulted ~~partly~~ from the lack of capability and restraint on the part of the other powers, had a negative influence on the immediate independence of Korea. It must be noted that the Chinese goal of "returning to Korea" was belatedly achieved in the form of the involvement of a newly-born CCP government in the Korean War in 1950. It is also worth making the point important to

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note that that existing studies by Korean scholars on KPG history have been unable to provide adequate and accurate descriptions of its activities and significance. Scholars have tended, ~~as they have tended~~ to ~~be preoccupied with~~ focus ~~focusing~~ only on the activities of the KPG itself, ignoring the policies of the powers the KPG had to deal with.

Glossary

He Yingqin (Ch.) 何應欽

Jiang Jieshi (Ch.) 蔣介石

Liu Bei (Ch.) 劉備

sanmin zhuyi (Ch.) 三民主義

Shao Yulin (Ch.) (邵 유자는 琿에서 포변 대신에 每번입니다 麟)한자?

Wang Chonghui (Ch.) 王崇輝

Wu Tiecheng (Ch.) 吳鐵城

Yang Yunzhu (Ch.) 陽雲竹 한자?

Zhongqing (Chongqing)(Ch.) 重慶

Zhu Jiahua (Ch.) 朱家驊

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foot-notes

- 1) Hurley to Roosevelt, 20 November ~~20~~, 1943, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, 1943, p. 264. Henceforth volumes in this series are referred to as *FRUS* with year, volume, and page numbers following.
- 2) *New York Herald Tribune*, 24 February ~~24~~, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.00/833. U.S. documents are cited as follows: sender to recipient (or document title), date, classification number, volume, document number (or page number). Documents on microfilm are cited as follows: sender to recipient (or document title), date, microfilm classification number/roll number (page).
- 3) Gauss to SS, 16 December ~~16~~, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, China*, pp. 266-267.
- 4) Memo by John Stewart Service, 7 April ~~7~~, 1944, *FRUS, 1944*, vol. 6, pp. 777-781.

- 5) Yi Hyeoŏn-hui, *Taehanmin'guk Daehanminguk imsijeonghŏngbusa* (History of the Korean Provisional Government) (Seoul: Jipmoondang Publishing Chimmundang, 1982), p. 354.
- 6) 저자? Zhongyang Yanjuiyuan Jindaishi Yangjiusuo (ed.), *Guomin zhengfu yu hanguo duli yundong shiliao* (Historical Materials Concerning the Nationalist Government and the Korean Independence Movement) (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjuiyuan Jindaishi Yangjiusuo, 1988); Shao Yu-lin, *Shihan hiyilu* (My Mission to Korea) (Taipei: Biographical International Press, 1980), ch. apters-1, 2; Hu Chunhui, "Chen Guofu yu Hanguo duli yundong" (Chen Guofu and the Korean Independence Movement)," *Zhong-han guanxishi guoji Ttnkaohui lunwenji* (Proceedings of International Conference on Sino-Korean Relations, 96?-1949 년도 확인 부탁드립니다. (정확합니다. 책 내용이 고려시대에서 해방까지를 다루고 있습니다.)) (Taipei: The Chinese Association for Korean Studies, 1983); Chen Lifu, "Jung'Chungguk-u-ŏi Hhan'guk tongnip-dongnip undong chiwŏn kwajiwon-gwa hanguk jiHan'guk chidoja-u-ŏi bpunjaeng" (Chinese Support for Korean Independence Movement and Factionalism among Korean Leaders), Chŏngsin Munhwa Yon'guwŏn (Academy of Korean StudiesIn) (ed.), *Han'guk d#ongnip undongsa charyojip-jaryojip* (Materials of Korean Independence Movement), ed. Academy of Korean Studies, (Seoul: BakyŏngsaPak Young Sa Publishing, 1983).
- 7) Shao YulinShao, *Shihan hiyilu*, p. 26.
- 8) "Chaoxian gedangpai huodong kinkuang baogao" (Report on recent activities of Korean factions), Xu Enzen to Zhu Jiahua, November 1941, *ShiliaoHistorical Materials Concerning...*, pp. 107-110.
- 9) Gauss to SS, 16 May 16, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.01/130 and enclosures.
- 10) Enclosure in Gauss to SS, 10 April, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.01/117.
- 11) Memorandum by Division of Far Eastern Affairs (DFEA), 22 April 22, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/266; Gauss to SS, 15 November 15, 1943, 895.01/300. The attendees at the time took Jiang's lecture as a "reproach," although a recent Korean study has interpreted it as an "encouragement." See Yi Hyeoŏn-hui, *Daehanminguk imsijeongbusa*, (1982), p. 355.
- 12) Gauss to SS, 12 February 12, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.01/81 and minutes.

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- 13) Dallin, David, J., *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (Hamden, ~~Connecticut~~Conn.: Archon Books, 1971), pp. 256-257.
- 14) “Qijiang Hanguo qi dang tongyi huiyi jingguo baosaoshu” (Unified conference of seven Korean parties at Qijiang, Wang Rongshen to Zhu Jiahua), 5 October ~~5~~, 1939, *Historical Materials Concerning... Shiliao*, pp. 25-28.
- 15) “Li Guangji zhi Zhu Jiahua wei baogao liu yu Hanren jiu fenhan” (On the dispute of the Koreans in ~~Chongqing~~Zhongqing, Li Guangji to Zhu Jiahua), 24 September ~~24~~, 1943, *Historical Materials Concerning... Shiliao*, pp. 589-604.
- 16) Gauss to SS, 3 January ~~3~~, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.01/56; 15 November ~~15~~, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/300.
- 17) "Korean Independence Movement," a report from Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services. [25 April ~~25~~, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.01/60-21/26.].
- 18) Indeed, Roosevelt and Stalin commented that the Poles were quarrelsome ~~people~~ not only at home but also abroad. See Gaddis, John Lewis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 162-163.
- 19) Gauss to SS, 12 February ~~12~~, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.01/81.
- 20) Gauss to SS, 25 November ~~25~~, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/199.
- 21) The original and translated texts are found in Gauss to SS, 11 December ~~11~~, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/200. For Korean records, see Yi ~~Hyonhui~~Hyeon-hui, *Daehanminguk imsijeongbusa*, pp. 343-344. Yi, however, eliminated either intentionally or unintentionally the latter part of article eight, which is an obvious neglect of China's true intention of having control over the Independence Army even outside China.
- 22) Enclosure in Gauss to SS, 25 November ~~25~~, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/199.
- 23) Enclosure in Gauss to SS, 11 December ~~11~~, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/200.
- 24) Enclosure in Gauss to SS, 18 April ~~18~~, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/335.
- 25) Gauss to SS, 29 June ~~29~~, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/6-2944 and its enclosure. In his diary, ~~Kim Ku~~Kim Gu writes: "My ~~Chongqing~~Zhongqing days mainly consisted of leading the KPG and taking refuge ~~{(from Japanese raids)}~~. I ate and slept only in between." Liu interprets this statement in the sense that he was almost incapable to do any meaningful activities. ~~{Liu}~~ Xiaoyuan, "Sino-American Diplomacy over

- Korea during World War II," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 1-2 (Summer 1992), p. 237; and Kim Ku Kim Gu, *Paekpŏm-Baekbeom Ilchji* (Diary of Kim Ku Kim Gu), first published in 1947 (1947; reprint, Seoul: Bumwoo Publishing Pŏm'usa, 1984), p. 248.
- 26) Enclosure in Gauss to SS, 29 June 29, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/6-2944. See also Kim, Gu, *ibid.*, p. 226.
- 27) Gauss to SS, 29 June 29, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/6-2944 and its enclosure.
- 28) Shao Yulin, *Shihan hiyilu*, Shao, p. 31.
- 29) Shao *ibid.*, pp. 42, 46-49.
- 30) Seymour to Eden, 28 February 28, 1943, 35956 (1462/723/23).
- 31) Gauss to SS, 15 April 15, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/337.
- 32) Gauss to SS, 29 June 29, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/6-2944 and enclosures. Kim Ku Kim Gu also mentioned this point. [Kim Gu, *Baekbeom Ilji*, p. 240].
- 33) Gauss to SS, 11 December 11, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/200 and enclosures.
- 34) Gauss to SS, 15 November 15, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/300 and enclosures; 18 April 18, 1944, 895.01/335 and enclosures.
- 35) Three conditions which Li Hongzhang (Li Hungchang) imposed on the Korean mission to Washington in 1887 included prior consultations with the Chinese legation "if there happens to be any serious question." [Nelson, M. Frederick, *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1945), p. 187.]
- 36) Gauss to SS, 11 December 11, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/200.
- 37) Vincent to SS, 17 March 17, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/244.
- 38) Gauss to SS, 11 December 11, 1942. LM79, R.2, 895.01/200; Acheson to SS, 13 August 13, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/280.
- 39) Shao Yulin, *Shihan hiyilu*, Shao, pp. 34, 43-44, 34.
- 40) On telegraphic information about the Koreans in America, for example, see Office of Censorship to Shaw (Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, SS), 10 May 10, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/326 and DFEA minutes for ?? (something missing) (on *ibid.*)
- 41) Vincent to SS, 17 March 17, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/244.
- 42) Enclosure to Gauss to SS, 12 February 12, 1942, LM79, R.1, 895.01/81; 25 November 25, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/199; 19 May 19, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/338.

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- 43) Gauss to SS, 9 December ~~9~~, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/197; DFEA memo, 23 January ~~23~~, 1943, 895.01/199.
- 44) Gauss to SS, 15 November ~~15~~, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/300.
- 45) Enclosures to Gauss to SS, 19 Amy (May or April?) (May) ~~19~~, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/338.
- 46) DFEA memo, 17 March ~~17~~, 1943, LM79, R.1, 895.01/89.
- 47) Gauss to SS, 25 November ~~25~~, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/199; ~~December 11~~ December 1942, 895.01/200.
- 48) DFEA Memo, 31 July ~~31~~, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/7-2144.
- 49) DFEA Memo-, 22 April ~~22~~, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/242.
- 50) Enclosure in Gauss to SS, 29 June ~~29~~, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/6-2944.
- 51) Box 55, P-Min47, Meeting of 13 March ~~13~~, 1943, Division of Political Studies, Records of Harley A. Notter, 1934-~~1945~~, in Jeong Yong-uk and Yi Gil-sang, Chŏng Yong-uk and Yi Kilsang, Haebang jeonhu chŏnhu migkuk-u-ŏi dŏaehan jeongchaeksa jehŏngchaeksa charyojip (Collected Materials on History of American Policy to Korea before and after Korean Liberation). Vol. 1, (Seoul: Darakbang Publishing Tarakbang, 1995), vol. 1, p. 306.
- 52) Memo. for Hopkins - Russia, 10 August ~~10~~, 1943, *FRUS, Washington and Quebec*, 1943, pp. 625-627.
- 53) Proposed Agenda for President's Conferences with Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi Chiang Kai-shek, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin, (undated). *FRUS, Cairo and Teheran*, p. 257; Memo by the Chinese Government, ~~November 24~~ November, 1943, *Ibid.*, p. 389.
- 54) Keiji Furuya, Keiji, (ed.), (abridged English edition of Chung-ming Chang 이 부분이 이곳으로 와야 할 것입니다) abridged English edition of Chung-ming Chang - Chiang Kai-shek - His Life and Times (New York: St. John's University Press, 1981), pp. 783, 788. abridged English edition of Chung-ming Chang
- 55) Shao Yulin Shao, Shihan hiyilu, pp. 53-54.
- 56) Roosevelt and Chiang Dinner Meeting, ~~November 23~~ November, 1943, *FRUS, Cairo and Teheran*, pp. 325, 334.
- 57) C-65, Memo by General Joseph W. Stilwell of Conversation with President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins and a fourth American whose name was deleted, Cairo,

- ~~December 6~~ December, 1943, -in Jeong Yong-uk and Yi Gil-sang, *Haebang jeonhu miguk-ui daehan jeongchaeksa jaryojip* Yi and Chong, vol. 2, p. 135.
- 58) Department of State, *United States Policy Regarding Korea 1834-1950*, p. 87.
- 59) SS to Gauss, May 12, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/340. China also realized the limitations set by the Cairo Declaration. Shao Yulin, *Shihan hiyilu* Shao, p. 38.
- 60) Gauss to SS, ~~December 29~~ December, 1942, LM79, R.2, 895.01/207.
- 61) Vincent to SS, ~~March 17~~ March, 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/244.
- 62) Gauss to SS, ~~December 7~~ December 1943, LM79, R.2, 895.01/301.
- 63) Strangely enough, Shao Yulin did not mention this meeting in his autobiography. [Shao Yulin, *Sŏngni-Seungni jeonheohu* (Before and After the Victory), trans. by Ha Chong'ok Jeong-ok (Seoul: Minjosa, 1969), pp. 34-38.]
- 64) Memo of Conversation by Ballantine, ~~February 5~~ February, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, vol. 6, pp. 1018-1020; ~~February 17~~ February, 1945, *Ibid.*, pp. 1020-1022.
- 65) This description is based on the Chinese records of how the issue was discussed. Liu Xiaoyuan, "Sino-American Diplomacy over Korea during World War II," [Liu, pp. 254-255.]
- 66) The Situation in China - Memo by DeWitt C. Poole (Office of Strategic Services), ~~May 20~~ May, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, vol. 7, p. 873.
- 67) Harriman to Truman and SS, ~~July 3~~ July, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, vol. 7, p. 914.
- 68) Memo by DeWitt C. Poole, ~~May 20~~ May, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, vol. 7, pp. 872-873; SWNCC-224, U.S. Policy toward China and Manchuria, ~~November 16~~ November, 1945, LM54, R.19.
- 69) The Chinese insisted that this displeased Rhee so much that when asked to give his agreement on Shao Yulin's appointment as the first Chinese ambassador to Korea, Rhee, as the first president of South Korea, held the decision in abeyance for half a year. [Jiang Junzhang, "Son Mmun, Chang-jang gae-seok Kaisok-uui hanguk Han'guk d-tongnip undong jehiwŏn" (Aid to the Korean Independence Movement by Sun Wen and Jiang Jieshi), in Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn'guwŏn (Academy of Korean Studies), (ed.), Han'guk d-tongnip undongsa jeharyojip (Materials of Korean Independence Movement), ed. The Academy of Korean Studies (Seoul: Bak Young Sa Publishing, Bakyŏngsa, 1983) (Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn'guwŏn (ed.), p. 204.

- 70) Seymour to Eden, ~~June-1~~ June, 1945, FO/371/46468 (3649/1394/23).
- 71) Gauss to SS, ~~June-3~~ June, 1944, LM79, R.2, 895.01/340; ~~April-18~~ April, 1944, enclosures to LM79, R.2, 895.01/335.
- 72) Shao Yulin, (My Mission To Korea.) 어느책인가요? My Mission To Korea? or Seungni jeonhu? pp. 55, 58; Memo by Acheson (Under SS): Trusteeship for Korea, ~~January 4~~ January, 1946, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1-446, RG59, Box 3824.
- 73) Seymour to Eden, ~~May-12~~ May, 1943, FO/371/35956 (2942/723/23) and minutes.

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