

Issues and Campaign Strategies in the 2002 Presidential Election

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate what strategies were effective in mobilizing voters under the political conditions in the 2002 presidential election in Korea. Just one month before the election, the probability of candidate Roh' s winning was low. The finding of this study is that Roh Moo-hyun's election campaign strategies and **unification of candidates** with Chung Mong-joon were critical to his win. Because Roh knew that he would lose without dramatic changes in electoral issues, he considered every strategy to win. And **the decision of the unification of candidacy** was one of them. It is ironic that he was able to win because he realized that he might lose. Analysis of empirical data shows that candidate unification was the detrimental factor contributing to Roh's success. **The effect of other issues, such as candle vigils, moving capital city and disclosure of alleged wiretap activities on the electoral result did not reverse the trend of candidate support.**

Key word: presidential election, electoral issue, candle demonstrates, Roh Moo-hyun, unification of candidates, Korean election, Chung Mong-joon

~~I.~~ Research Scope

—Not only do all elections **have share points of** continuity with previous elections, but **also**

each ~~election one has is~~ also marked by its own singularities/particularities. Accordingly, ~~once as the an~~ election outcome is announced, researchers begin to study-pore over the factors that influenced the outcome. Similarly, after the conclusion of the sixteenth presidential election in 2002, the media gave-offered a series of analyses on the outcome, sometimes giving general impressions and other times quoting specialists to strengthen their ir claims. Most analyses by the media, however, were often fragmented and merely descriptive, with-using references to individual voters to support their arguments ex post facto.

Based on various analytical tools and verifiable materials from existing election studies, however limited they are may be, from existing election studies this paper will be-offer a comprehensive analysis of the factors that influenced the outcome of the 2002 presidential election. Instead of the-painting a picture of a dichotomous outcome, with of the Millennium Democratic Party's (MDP) victory and the Grand National ~~party~~ Party's (GNP) defeat, the paper will focus on the factors that helped each candidate in-winning win votes. In other words, the primary focus of the paper is-will be on illuminating the factors that gave-gave 570,000 more votes to Roh Moo-hyun 570,000 more votes than his opponent Lee Hoi-chang. The paper also focuses on why the GNP failed to carry over to the presidential election the winning streak the-that party enjoyed in the general and local elections.

Many have debated over the extent to which election campaign affect the election outcome. There are some For those who hold the negative position that effect of issues raised during an election campaign period has little impact on voting choice. They believe this is due to the fact that because they believe that most voters' position on-campaign campaign issues are often determined by their preconceived notions about either the candidate or the political party s/the candidate represents. Others, on the other hand, believe that although campaign issues mobilize only a few partisan voters, these se issues have a major impact on the outcome since it is the undecided voters, not the partisan voters, who are often play the decisive role in election outcomes. On a closer look Upon a closer look at the seemingly opposite-opposing views on the effect of campaign issues on the election outcome, the actual differences in the views seem to hinge on the question of whether to focus on the extent of the mobilization of voters or on the outcome itself.

~~H.~~ Factors Influencing ~~the~~ Election Outcome

—According to existing studies, the factors influencing voting behavior can be divided into four categories: the personal merits of the candidates, evaluation of ~~the~~ policies, the overall evaluation of the incumbent administration, and the voter's party membership. First, as for the personal merits of the candidate, ~~it~~ this category includes the over-all image as expressed in particular character traits (honesty, morality, ~~ferve~~ passion) ~~and as well as abilities~~ ability (knowledge, competitiveness, leadership) (Page 1987). Since ~~the~~ detailed information ~~for about~~ the candidate is often made available just before the election campaign, it is considered an important factor when making short-term predictions on election outcome. In certain cases, however, images about the candidates can have a tremendous influence on the election outcome. For example, the determinant variable in the fifteenth presidential election in 1997 was the draft dodging scandal of the sons of the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang. The scandal tainted Lee's image as a man of law and principle and is regarded as a factor that led to his defeat. Accordingly, it seems that a campaign strategy that focuses on the candidate's image may ~~prove~~ be a decisive factor in the outcome.¹

Secondly, the issues ~~that are~~ raised during an election campaign influence voting behavior. Issues can be defined as opinions related to deciding what the government should or should not do in the big, rather than all things that cause dispute between contending candidates. In other words, the focus of analysis is often on the policies with conflicting interests for the rivaling parties. In addition to general political differences based on the ideological differences of the candidates, the particular positions of the candidates also set them apart from one another. If elections ~~is~~ meaningful have meaning in that voters ~~can~~ have the power to influence government policies by electing government officials to represent their views, the argument that the candidates' differences in policy positions are decisive factors in voting is very persuasive. For issues to have any influence on voting, some prerequisite conditions must be satisfied: the voters must have knowledge of and opinions on the issues and recognize the differences between the

¹ This factor is said to have played a role in the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. Seventy percent of absentee voters are men in their twenties serving the mandatory military service, and 67 percent of these men supported Roh Moo-hyun, showing a slight difference from 60 percent of the voters in the twenties who have voted for Roh according to the election exit polls. The difference could be attributed to the sensitivity of the issue of draft dodging for the men in the military, which may have caused their disapproval of Lee Hoi-chang.

candidates' positions. However, there are many cases in which the prerequisite conditions are not met (Campbell et al. 1960, 167-87). Sometimes the issues have little impact on the outcome because either the voters are not sophisticated enough to take a position on them or there are almost no discernible differences ~~in-between~~ the candidates' positions.² Sometimes it works to the candidate's advantage to take an ambiguous ~~position-stance~~ on certain issues (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). It is difficult to say that such issues have any decisive effect on voting.

Thirdly, the overall evaluation of the administration's performance is another factor that influences a voter's decision. In ~~some-a~~ sense, the election is a tool to reward or punish the incumbent administration. The evaluation of the administration's performance is particularly meaningful when the incumbent president runs for re-election; however, this aspect of election has relatively no power of influence in South Korea, with its system of single-term presidency. Nevertheless, the presidential candidate for the ruling party is subjected to the public's assessment of the government's performance. For example, in the 1997 presidential race, the opposition party emphasized the policy failures of the ruling party as the main cause of the IMF crisis, and ~~the-this~~ strategy significantly influenced the election outcome. Moreover, the GNP was able to win both the sixteenth National Assembly election (2000) and the June 13 local elections (2002) ~~by-with~~ its strategy of attacking the Kim Dae-jung administration. Evaluating the incumbent administration's performance can influence other ~~elections other than the re-election bid~~types of elections as well. In terms of voting behavior being influenced by the government's performance or competence, a voter's decision will depend on whether he or she places emphasis on the administration's past performance (retrospective voting) or on choosing the candidate or party that would be most competent in resolving the issues at hand (prospective voting).³

Fourthly, party identification is another major factor that affects voting. The concept of party identification varies among experts. Initially, ~~the~~Western experts understood party identification as fixed by the voter's socioeconomic status (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). However, this view was criticized for failing to account for the dynamic aspects of party identification, ~~and, in~~In the 1960s, a group of scholars began to move away from this deterministic view to redefine the

² A study shows that consistency in the voters' position depends on the degree of complexity of the issues. (Carmines and Stimson 1980; ~~Cho Ki-sook~~ 1998).

³ There is a study that showed that some voters participated in prospective voting in the 1997 presidential election. The empirical showed that some voters still voted for Lee Hoi-chang over Kim Dae-jung, because, even though they thought the ruling party should take the responsibility for the IMF crisis, they felt that Lee was the more competent candidate than Kim (Lee Hyeon-woo 1998).

concept by including an emotional factor, ~~to theorizing~~ how ~~one an individual~~ comes to identify with a particular party (Campbell et al. 1960). Subsequently, those scholars, using the rational choice model as the basic framework, conducted studies that applied the ~~cost-of-information~~ view as a way to show that voters often employ party identification as an efficient tool in evaluating a candidate or a political party. Fiorina's study (Fiorina 1981) is perhaps the most comprehensive ~~study one~~ on party identification. According to Fiorina, each voter keeps a running tally of the performance of each party, and when the election time comes, the voter conducts a reevaluation based on ~~the~~ cumulative evaluations, all of which determines the voter's preference for one party over another.

When applying this Western concept of party identification in the Korean case, it seems ~~ed~~ that, prior to the period before 1987 when the political party system was volatile, party identification was often defined by one's inclination towards the ruling or opposition party (Jo Jung-bin 1993). Recent studies on people's inclinations towards the ruling or opposition party showed a close correlation to party identification. This supposition is based on the findings that people's loyalty may change with as the regime changes, and after the democratization of South Korea, regionalism ~~determined was the primary determinant of~~ one's ~~party identification with a party~~ (Lee Kap-yun 2002).

It is necessary to point out that the four above-mentioned ~~four~~ factors influencing the voting behavior are neither independent nor mutually exclusive of each other. For example, party identification is a factor that is most enduring and least subjected to change, and hence it has a high potential ~~to of~~ influence how the remaining three factors—~~the~~ candidate attributes, stance on issues, and the incumbent administration's performance—are evaluated. Empirical studies show that people tend to be relatively lenient ~~on~~ with their evaluation of the incumbent administration if the party of in which their loyalty lies is presently in office, ~~and to show in which case there is~~ positive bias in evaluating the candidate of the party of their choice. Moreover, people tend to accept their party's position on the issues with which they are not familiar (Jackson 1975). Regionalism is the most influential factor in voting in Korea after democratization, ~~and~~ upon Upon careful study of its relationship to other factors, it becomes clear that ~~the a~~ voter's loyalty to a party affects the evaluation of the other factors rather than ~~the other factors vice versa~~ ~~such as issues or policies, affecting the voter's decision to identify with a certain party~~ (Lee Kap-yun 2002, 168-176). Accordingly, the four factors should be understood as being mutually

affecting and hence methodologically, it is only when other variables are controlled that the extent of each variable's influence can be accurately measured.

III. Campaign Strategies and the Issues

Campaign Context???? Electoral Situations (or) Composition?? 선거구도 and Strategies

—The studies on the 2002 presidential election outcome done after the election place ,laying too much emphasis on the MDP's victory, tending to focus their analyses on the factors that led to the victory of MDP and the defeat of the GNP. Although the winner takes all in an election, if the purpose of the research is to analyze the election in depth, it is appropriate that the focus should be on the 2.3 percent margin of difference, the difference of 570,000 votes that played a decisive role. Therefore, this paper will examine each party's the campaign strategies of and electoral issues, each party and election issues and focus while focusing on the public's assessment of each party's campaign strategy. To ensure maximum objectivity, this paper will utilize will also utilize on the opinion polls conducted during the campaign in order to discern how much influence each election issue had on the public's opinion for of each candidate. Conducting The basic assumption of this analysis is that electoral outcome is the result of the the opinion polls of a given day. For the discussion of the range of the issues and their the power extent of their influence, this paper uses the data from the official beginning of the campaign.

After sweeping victories in the by-election and June 13 local elections in 2002, the GNP entered the 2002 presidential race basking in the prevalent pro-Lee Hoi-chang mood, confident that Lee will would be the next president. Thus, rather than planning a new strategy or attempting to expand support base his base of support, the GNP opted for maintaining the favorable mood at the time, believing it to be the safest winning strategy. The MDP also conceded the GNP's lead; therefore, the MDP was compelled to seek any means to make up for the series of defeats that followed the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration.

Even though it is criticism based on the result, anticipation of the MDP's loss the context did, in the end, work to the MDP's advantage. In the previous election, the GNP adopted the strategy of criticizing the Kim Dae-jung administration's poor performance, which helped to win

votes. Considering the prevalence of negative public opinion towards the Kim Dae-jung administration in early 2002, it is no surprise that, with the upcoming presidential election, the GNP chose the strategy that ~~lays stressed on~~ reparation of and punishment for the incumbent administration's poor performance.⁴

Moreover, with the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang's approval ratings exceeding by over 10% those of Rhee In-je, then front-runner for the MDP's presidential nomination, nomination of another candidate within the GNP was not considered at all. Convinced that it had to look for an unprecedented solution, the MDP introduced the **national primary system** as a last resort to change the electoral conditions. The MDP's goal in the 2002 presidential campaign was that of preventing Lee Hoi-chang from getting elected. The political climate up until ~~the~~ early 2002 was such that the very survival of the MDP was at stake, and it desperately needed a way to turn the tide. ~~[I'm a little unsure about what you mean here — do you mean that in general, when a party feels confident, or are you talking about the particular case of the MDP in the last election. I think you are talking about the later, but I can't in fact be sure enough to offer a good edit here.]~~ It In fact, the situation was so desperate that the MDP was willing to support anyone as long as ~~the person~~ that person could help ~~to~~ prevent Lee Hoi-chang from winning. Such political circumstances gave the MDP the liberty to review all the alternatives without being fettered by its vested interests, ~~and mademaking~~ it possible to introduce the **national primary election system** ~~to for elect~~ nominating the a presidential candidate. The most important factor in candidate nomination was, of course, the candidate's potential for winning the presidential election, and candidate Roh Moo-hyun's victory in the primaries and the sharp rise in his popularity ratings were both very encouraging for the MDP.

However, the popular interest in the national primaries and the ensuing support for the MDP candidate Roh Moo-hyun lost its sustaining power, ~~and, with~~ With the MDP's crushing defeat in the 13 June ~~13~~ local elections, Lee Hoi-chang's poll ratings took the lead ~~against over~~ Roh Moo-hyun. Amidst the downward trend in the approval ratings for candidate Roh, Chung Mong-joon announced his bid for presidency, which further drained Roh Moo-hyun's support base. Here, the young voters played a key role in the downward trend in Roh's poll ratings. When some of the

⁴ According to an opinion poll conducted by ~~Hankyoreh newspaper~~, President Kim Dae-jung received 19.1 percent positive ratings and 36 percent negative ratings (~~January 1 January~~; 2002). A Gallup poll evaluating President Kim's performance, 30.5 percent of the respondents answered that they the president was doing a good job and 49.1 percent said that he was doing a poor job (*The Choson Ilbo*, 1 January 2002).

young voters who supported Roh shifted their support to Chung Mong-joon, it resulted in a relatively greater loss of support for Roh than that of the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang. Now with a three-way bid for presidency, rather than two-way, both Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-joon camps reached the conclusion that unless they ~~come~~ came up with a single unified candidate, neither would win the election. On ~~24~~ 24 November-~~24~~, the Republic witnessed a dramatic event in which Roh Moo-hyun became the unified candidate. ~~As an outside reader, I am MOST curious as to how this happened! Were there any conflicts here? Did Roh gain all of Chung's voter base? It just seems to jump a bit. Perhaps you might mention that this will be talked about a little later?!~~ With the election of Roh as the unified candidate, Roh's approval ratings went up and he took the lead.⁵

Absent in the above account of the occasion that turned the tide in popular support is any discernible attempt on the part of the Lee Hoi-chang camp to come up with countermeasures. Although Roh Moo-hyun was leading in the poll ratings from March to May of 2002, the GNP felt that it was still too early in the race to deploy aggressive counterstrategies; and, with the renewed confidence after its victories in the local elections, the ~~MDP-GNP~~ decided that maintaining its current strategy was the best available strategy. Especially since the GNP, as well as its candidate Lee Hoi-chang, had never lagged behind the MDP in poll ratings, it decided arbitrarily that those who responded indecisively to the GNP-led opinion polls ~~are~~ were Lee Hoi-chang supporters. In addition, since ~~Even~~ opinion polls ~~are~~ were conducted based on population distribution, the analysis of ~~the~~ poll results ~~made allowance~~ took into account for the ~~and thereafter relied on the assumption of a~~ relatively low voter turnout among the young ~~people, which~~ This also assumed means there will be a greater ~~voter~~ turnout among the middle-aged and elderly, who constituted ~~the~~ majority of Lee Hoi-chang's support base.

Before the campaign went in full swing, the GNP led the MDP in ~~ratings~~ the polls by more than ~~five~~ percent, ~~and since~~ And since the approval ratings for Lee Hoi-chang had remained stable at around 35 percent, while ~~that those~~ of candidate Roh Moo-hyun's fluctuated, the GNP calculated that it ~~can~~ could gain enough votes to secure victory by campaigning to absorb the swing votes. As ~~the~~ election day approached, the GNP, rather than taking the risk of making new campaign pledges, once again deployed the strategy of stressing the poor performance record of

⁵ See An Bu-geun's paper (2003) for detailed analysis of the changes in public opinion for each phase of the campaign.

the incumbent administration, reminding the public that Roh Moo-hyun represented the ruling MDP.

Although the MDP chose Roh Moo-hyun as the sole candidate who could compete against the opposition party candidate Lee Hoi-chang for presidency, when the possibility of Roh's victory seemed unlikely, internal bickering and confusion reached the peak when the party was confronted with the task of choosing a unified candidate between Roh and Chun Mong-joon and dissenting voices called for a new candidate. After much debate, the MDP decided that the only way to increase the chance of winning the election is to steer the voters' attention away from the incumbent administration by introducing new issues. With the approval ratings for the Kim Dae-jung administration resting at the rock bottom, being the candidate that represented the ruling party worked against as a liability for Roh, and thus the Roh camp needed to feel the need for a strategy to disassociate itself from the incumbent administration. The strategy was to create the image of Roh and the MDP as representing a new generation of Korean politics, stressing the contrast with President Kim Dae-jung and the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang by defining them both together, as representatives of the politics of the past.

3. Campaign Issues of the Sixteenth Presidential Election

Debate over policy issues not only creates a desirable climate for an election campaign, but such a thing is also healthy for democracy. Competition between candidates based on differences in policies is the most desirable campaign culture for democracy; however, in presenting their policy stances during the campaign, the candidates placed greatest importance on how many votes they could gain by doing so. The premise is that the basic goal of the politician is that of winning the election (Downs 1957). Hence, in theory, the candidates express their policy stances at the point where they can win the most median voters. Should the contending candidates opt for such a strategic move at the same time, the result will be a convergence in the policy positions of the candidates, making it difficult to identify the policy differences between the candidates.

Overall, the 2002 presidential election is not exceptional. With the exception of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) candidate Kwon Young-ghil, both candidates Lee and Roh often resorted to principles as their positions, which made it difficult for voters to discern the

differences ~~in their positions~~ between their platforms.⁶ The studies by the experts ~~that who~~ focused on differences in the policy stances of the candidates show that, as is generally known, Lee Hoi-chang's policy stance ~~is was~~ more conservative than that of former pPresident Kim Dae-jung.^{6,7} Roh Moo-hyun's ~~was~~ more progressive, ~~and while that of~~ Kwon Young-ghil's of the DLP ~~was~~, near ultraprogressive, showing a definite contrast ~~in the~~ between their policy positions.⁷ Since the policy position of each candidate coincided with his image, it is difficult to say that policy issues had any significant impact on the voters' decision.

In connection with policy issues, what requires even greater attention are the new issues that were raised during the campaign. The main issues ~~that affected~~ affecting voting behavior are listed below in <Table 1>.

<Table 1>_ Main Issues Raised during the 2002 Presidential Election

Issue	Date	The Candidate Likely to Benefit
Unified candidacy	24 Nov.	Roh Moo-hyun
F Alleged wiretap activities of the National Intelligence Service (NIS)	28 Nov.	Lee Hoi-chang
Candlelight demonstrates for the middle school girls killed by a U.S. armored vehicle	1 Dec.	Roh Roh Moo-hyun
M oving the administrative capital to Chungcheong Province <u>region</u>	10 Dec.	Roh Roh Moo-hyun

1) Consolidating Candidacies

— Roh Moo-hyun of the MDP and Chung Mong-joon of the National Alliance 21, Recognizing ~~the-that~~ GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang was guaranteed a certain victory if they both

⁶ See the comparison of campaign pledges published in the 27 November 2002 issue of *The JoongAng Ilbo* and the ~~22~~ November ~~22~~-2002 issue of *The Dong-a Ilbo*. There is an article in the 10 December issue of *The Dong-a Ilbo* titled "Verbal Attacks Accusing the Other Party of Plagiarizing."

⁷ Using 12 pending policy issues, the number "0" was assigned to the current administration's line of policy or state of affairs, "-1" for the **ultraprogressive** view, and "+1" for ultraconservative. After evaluating each candidate's views on the issues, Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP scored 0.25, Roh Moo-hyun of the MDP -0.33, and Kwon Young-ghil of the DLP -0.83 (*The Choson Ilbo*, 2 December 2002).

run for the presidency (see Figure 1), on 16 November 2002, Roh Moo-hyun of the MDP and Chung Mong-joon of the National Alliance agreed to unify their candidacies using opinion polls. Excluding those respondents supporting Lee Hoi-chang, the rest of the respondents were asked to choose between Roh and Chung for the unified candidacy to run against the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang. Based on the percentage of respondents, it was agreed that the candidate who receives even more support, however slim the margin, would run for the presidency. However, to prevent any attempts by supporters of Lee Hoi-chang to manipulate the polls to choose the easier candidate to run against Lee, it was agreed that should the approval ratings for Lee be below his recent lowest one, it was agreed that the poll results will be considered null and void. On 24 November 2002, according to the result of the poll conducted by the research company Research & Research (R&R) showed that Roh received 46.8 percent and Chung 42.4 percent, making Roh the unified candidate.⁸




Figure 1. Trend in Favorable Ratings for Each Candidate before Unified Candidacies

⁸ The polls were conducted by R&R and World Research, and R&R results showed Roh in lead with 38.8 percent to Chung's 37.0 percent. However, World Research results that showed Lee's poll ratings (28.7 percent) below his lowest poll ratings of 30.4 percent were considered null and void. According to the findings of R&R, Lee Hoi-chang's poll ratings was recorded to be 32.1 percent.

—After unifying the candidacy, there was a significant turn in the public's support for the candidates. According to the *Dong-a Ilbo's* ~~research~~, after unifying the candidacies, 53 percent of Chung Mong-joon supporters ~~turned to~~ support Roh and 24 percent Lee Hoi-chang (26 November 26, 2002).⁹ In ~~the research~~ a poll conducted on November 16, Lee Hoi-chang was in the lead, with 46.2 percent to Roh's 37.8 ~~percent~~; however, after the ~~unified candidacies~~ unification of the candidacy, Roh ~~took had taken~~ the lead with 43.5 percent to Lee's 37 ~~percent~~.

That ~~unifying candidacies~~ the unification of candidacies was a decisive factor in Roh Moo-hyun's victory is undisputed. However, it is important to look at the circumstances, rather than only the outcome, in which the unification of candidacies took place. It should be noted that young voters ~~make made~~ up the main group of supporters for both Roh and Chung. ~~To~~ If one were to place each of the three candidates, Roh, Chung, and Lee, ~~on along the an~~ ideological spectrum, Chung ~~will would have to~~ be placed in proximity to Lee Hoi-chang. ~~If~~ To the extent that Roh Moo-hyun advocated European economic and social welfare system, with an emphasis on distribution and welfare, Chung placed ds importance on individual capacity and competition based on a free ~~the~~ market. The sharp disparities between the two candidates also appear in their ~~chaebol-jaebeol~~ policy. While Roh advocated thes implementation ing of a policy regulating ~~chaebol-jaebeol~~, including a class action lawsuit system, Chung believed ds in minimizing government intervention and regulation, and leaving the market principles to regulate businesses. On the National Security Law, Roh advocated ds its abolition, while Chung is for partial revision while maintaining the framework. As shown, the policy positions of the two candidates are clearly different.¹⁰

Despite the differences between their policy stances, Roh and Chung recognized that the votes from their overlapping support base would split unless they ~~come came~~ up with a unified candidate, and that if they succeeded ed in selecting a unified candidate, ~~the that~~ candidate ~~can could~~ effectively collect votes from ~~young voters~~ the young. That two candidates with vastly different policy positions ~~can were able to~~ share a single support base may be saying something about the similarities of young voters. In other words, younger generations ~~pay paid~~ greater attention to the image that appealed to their feelings or emotions (~~??감성적 이미지~~) than to the candidate's

⁹ In another research, conducted by *Hankyoreh*, showed that 65.9 percent of voters who supported Chung were in favor of Roh, 24.9 percent abstained, and only 6.1 percent supported Lee Hoi-chang. The abstention of a quarter of Chung's supporters is considered as a cause for the drop in the voting turnouts (21 December 2002).

ideological leanings or policy positions. Roh ~~showed put forth an the~~ image of reformer, calling for ~~the~~ eradication of regionalism and ~~the~~ establishment of ~~a~~ new ~~kind of~~ politics. ~~With his youth image, which set him apart from the conservative politicians,~~ Chung was also seen as a candidate who could bring about ~~real~~ change ~~with his youth image~~ ~~at that set him apart from the conservative politicians~~. On the other hand, Lee Hoi-chang, who ~~ran had run~~ for the presidency in the previous presidential race and worked as the GNP leader for the last five years, was seen as representative of the old generation of politicians. Therefore, young voters ~~with the demand for~~ ~~demanding a~~ change in politics viewed the presidential election as conservatives running against progressives and supported Roh and Chung as candidates who could bring about desired changes.

That image of the candidates ~~played~~ played an important role in the 2002 presidential election is demonstrated by the support received by candidate Chung Mong-joon. Although he was a member of the National Assembly, most voters knew him as one of the heirs to the Hyundai Group fortune. Even though Chung played a key role in the successful hosting of the 2002 World Cup, such accomplishments had little effect on the voters' evaluation of his capacity as the president of Korea. ~~Despite the overwhelmingly negative attitude of the public, especially of the young people, towards chaebolsjaebeol, that the fact that~~ Chung lacked any close association with old politics worked to his advantage. That Chung Mong-joon received 30 percent of public support ~~without with little few~~ political accomplishments to speak of ~~shows demonstrates the extent to which that~~ his personal image ~~not his policies~~ was the contributing factor. Moreover, it was the young voters ~~who were~~, desperate for change, who constituted the majority of Chung's support base, ~~who was having been~~ moved more by Chung's youthful image rather than his political accomplishments.

2) Wiretap Scandal of the National Intelligence Service

—The Grand National Party (GNP) criticized the unified candidacy as an illicit union ~~to seize intent on seizing~~ the presidency, ~~and, even for its short-term effect, which~~ often devaluated the rapidly rising popularity of its rival candidate Roh Moo-hyun. ~~And the GNP anticipated that the effects of~~ surge in popularity due to the unified candidacy would be ~~short-lived~~. In an attempt to take the lead in the bid for presidency, the GNP revealed a document implicating the Kim Dae-

¹⁰ *The Choson Ilbo*, 22 November 2002; *Nae Way Economic Daily*, 22 November 2002.

jung administration in using the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to illegally wiretap the phones of party members of both the ruling and opposition parties and those of the press. On ~~1~~ December ~~4~~, the GNP revealed additional documents supporting the allegation. The GNP attempted to launch a negative campaign by questioning the morality of the Kim Dae-jung administration. They hoped ~~to carry over that the~~ the ruling MDP candidate Roh Moo-hyun would inherit the negative ~~image of the previous administration.~~ image to the ruling MDP candidate Roh Moo-hyun

However, the GNP's negative campaign did not bring about the result they expected ~~go as they had hoped~~. In fact, it backfired. Not only did the GNP ~~failed~~ to understand the interests of the voters, but ~~also~~ its exposure tactics ~~actually~~ reflected negatively on the party ~~by bringing in that it evoked up~~ the image of the mudslinging that characterized elections of the past, ~~only giving the occasion to ingrain in the minds of the~~ serving only ~~to remind~~ voters ~~of~~ the negative aspect of such politics. The GNP's tactics only ~~sent~~ ~~succeeded in sending~~ out the message to the public that ~~the GNP's~~ two feet ~~still were still~~ firmly planted in the swamp ~~of~~ old politics. When the MDP adopted the more dignified campaign strategy of refraining from negative campaign ~~tactics~~ and refused to waste its energies on denying the allegations of the GNP, the public soon lost interest in the allegations.

What the GNP ~~oversaw~~ overlooked was that the voters viewed the election ~~from their terms of a~~ binary opposition between ~~the~~ conservatives and ~~the~~ progressives, rather than as an evaluation of the incumbent government. That the GNP ~~has had~~ been misguided can be readily demonstrated by looking at how ~~little attention~~ the media paid ~~little attention~~ to the GNP's allegation about the illegal wiretapping. The media did not ~~cover~~ ~~treat~~ the wiretap scandal as important news after ~~3~~ December ~~3~~. In fact, after ~~1~~ December ~~4~~, the media was preoccupied with the coverage of the candlelight vigils for the two middle school girls killed by a U.S. armored vehicle and the protesters who demanded the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

3) Candlelight Vigils and the Revision of SOFA

— In July, some 4000 people, including NGOs, came together to protest the tragic incident of ~~13~~ June ~~13~~ 2002, in which two middle school girls were killed by a U.S. armored vehicle, ~~and~~ ~~Although~~ the U.S. military's ~~refusal~~ ~~refusal~~ to hand over ~~the~~ jurisdiction to the Korean government ran contrary to the national sentiment, ~~;~~ yet the case failed to ~~gather~~ ~~garner~~ nationwide attention.

However, when the jury of the U.S. military court acquitted the soldiers, the public's outrage became widespread. People continued to protest the court decision, and Minbyun, the "Lawyers for a Democratic Society,"¹¹ called for a prompt revision of the [Status of Forces Agreement \(SOFA\)](#). What began as a candlelight vigil on ~~30~~ November ~~30~~ soon became a nationwide rally that congregated every weekend during the election period to pay respect to the victims and to demand revision of the SOFA.

The protest against the unjust court ruling and the demand for the revision of the SOFA were two issues that received much attention, but because of the traces of anti-American sentiment behind the issues ~~neither both~~ Roh Moo-hyun ~~and nor~~ Lee Hoi-chang could express ~~neither support nor or~~ opposition. To give explicit support to the candlelight demonstrations carried for the conservative candidate Lee Hoi-chang the burden of alienating himself from the conservatives who constituted ~~the his~~ central support base. As for Roh Moo-hyun, who had been trying to tone down his image as ~~a~~ radical, he could not risk taking a position that would place him at the forefront of an anti-American movement. When taking a stance ~~involves involving~~ risk, the candidates did not openly take one position. Such a tendency was clearly demonstrated in the first TV debate of the campaign. When the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) candidate Kwon Young-ghil asked candidates Roh and Lee to sign the petition for the revision of the SOFA and take the lead in the cause, Roh as well as Lee evaded making any commitments by stating the need to exercise prudence on such matters.

Although the two candidates were ambiguous on the issues, the ~~nature of the~~ case worked to the advantage of the progressive candidate Roh Moo-hyun. As for Lee, supporting the cause would have prompted ~~criticism~~ criticism from his main support base without the assurance that the move would garner him support from young voters. Therefore, Lee could not establish an aggressive strategy to expand his support base based on the issues.¹¹ Although Roh could have strengthened his support base among young voters by supporting the anti-American demonstrations, he refrained from doing so ~~to avoid for fear of~~ antagonizing conservative ~~those~~ voters who were apprehensive of the possible consequences of ~~the such an~~ action. Taking these considerations into account, the two leading candidates maintained ~~the positions~~ based on principles, making no attempt to differentiate their views on the matter.

¹¹ On ~~3~~ December ~~3~~, Yi Bu-yeong, member of the National Assembly and of the GNP, led the petition demanding a revision of the SOFA; however, the GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang maintained a low profile on

4) Relocation of the Administrative Capital

— On 8 December~~8~~, Roh Moo-hyun made a campaign pledge in Daejeon to relocate the administrative capital to Chungcheong region~~Province~~. Until now~~that time~~, it was difficult for the voters to differentiate between the policy positions of the two leading candidates. The unified candidacy was an attempt to change the electoral situations; the wiretap scandal was an example of a negative campaign; and the issues linked to the candlelight demonstrations were brought forth by external factors unintended by the rivaling parties. However, Roh's pledge to relocate the administrative capital was an issue that set the two candidates apart. It is important to consider the reasons behind Roh's decision to make such a controversial pledge just ten days before the~~the~~ election.

Even though Roh was in the lead by about 3 percent in the polls by December, the Roh camp could not rest assured on its laurels, considering with~~the~~ the hidden 5 percent that the GNP claimed they had to have as their supporters. Since the polls were conducted nationwide, the MDP could not ascertain victory when taking into account the voter turnout by age group on the actual election. Accordingly, the MDP needed to expand its support base and decided to target Chungcheong region~~Province~~, where regionalism had little effect on voting and many voters were undecided until that time. The real concern was how much negative impact of the pledge to relocate the administrative capital would have on Roh's support base in Seoul. So as a measure to appease the voters in Seoul, Roh pointed out the benefits of moving the administrative capital and assured the voters that the relocation will not cause devaluation in real estates in Seoul~~prices there~~. The GNP's countermeasure for to Roh's relocation pledge to relocate the administrative capital proved ineffective. The GNP pursued a line of attack that included pointing out the cost of relocation and the possibility of devaluation of real estates in Seoul, but the arguments lost their persuasive power when it was reported that Lee Hoi-chang had made the same campaign pledge in the past election.

Roh Moo-hyun's strategy to win maximum support was playing the regionalism card in areas where useful and focusing on issues in the areas where he had a weak support base. For example, he would maintain anti-Lee Hoi-chang sentiment in the MDP's strongholds such as the

the matter. The move may signify the GNP's wish to cater to the public sentiment.

~~Cholla~~Jeolla ~~region~~Provinces, downplay regionalism in the ~~Kyongsang—Gyeongsang~~ ~~region~~Provinces, and preempt the issues in other areas. In particular, the MDP's recognition of the Chungcheong ~~region~~Provinces as the decisive region in the election outcome may have been interpreted as paying compliments to the region. —Such strategies led to the ~~successful~~ election ~~outcome~~results Roh expected. Roh received 4.5 million votes in ~~Jeolla and Gyeongsang~~ ~~regions~~ ~~Cholla and Kyongsang~~ provinces combined, just an inch away from Lee Hoi-chang's 4.87 million votes, making it possible for Roh to overcome the disadvantages due to regionalism.¹²

IV. The Influence of Election Issues

—In the preceding section, this paper looked at the various issues that were raised during the campaign. The direction of shifting support that may result from the issues was also mentioned. Now, the paper will make a detailed analysis of how much influence each issue exerted. The two figures below clearly illustrate how much ~~influence~~ the campaign issues ~~had~~ ~~influenced~~ throughout the presidential race.

As indicated in the two figures below, that Roh Moo-hyun led the favorable ratings despite the fact that the GNP maintained approval ratings of 3 to 17 percent ahead of the MDP even after November clearly shows that Roh was in the lead in terms of campaign issues and candidate's image. While the GNP took its lead in approval ratings as an occasion to focus on attacking the incumbent administration, Roh more efficiently led the whole campaign under the slogan ~~“New politics vs. the-outdated politics.”~~

¹² Of the total number of votes received by candidate Roh, 29.9 percent came from Busan, 18.7 percent from Daegu, and 21.7 percent from ~~North-Gyeongsangbuk-do~~ pProvince. From ~~North-Gyeongsangnam-do~~ pProvince, Roh received 27.1 percent, twice the number of votes Kim Dae-jung received in ~~Gyeongsang~~ ~~Provinces~~region in the fifteenth presidential election.





Figure 2. Trend in Partisan Support



11. 25 - unified candidacy / 12. 5 - Candlelight demonstrations / 12. 3 - first TV debate / 12. 14 - relocating administrative capital

Figure 3. Support for Each Candidate

— The simplest method to see whether the issues mentioned really had any effect on the

approval ratings is using the before-and-after comparison of the two candidates' poll ratings to detect any changes. Comparing the approval ratings of ten days before with those immediately following the consolidation of candidacies, Roh's approval ratings ~~soared~~ surged by up 8 percent ~~while even as~~ Lee's went down by 5 percent. This marked the turning point that gave the lead to Roh, and the trend continued, even though other issues were since raised, until ~~the~~ election day. Therefore, if forced to pick the single factor that had the greatest influence ~~in the~~ election outcome, it would be the consolidation of candidacies between Roh and Chung. On the other hand, the wiretap scandal had no visible impact.

The candlelight demonstration was not a short-term, but rather a long-term issue. But because the two leading candidates maintained a principle position that the **Korean-U.S. relations** should be equal, there were no visible changes in the poll ratings. After the first TV debate on 3 December ~~3~~, poll ratings dropped slightly for both Roh and Lee, but Roh's poll ratings dropped more than his rival Lee's. The drops in the ratings can be explained by referring to the TV debate. Kwon Young-ghil, the DLP candidate who had been previously simply dismissed ~~simply~~ as a radical, had his first opportunity to meet a greater pool of voters. In the debate, Kwon's call for reform in the **Korean-U.S. relations** and his strong criticism of the politics in the past made a greater emotional appeal to the voters than Lee and Roh, who tiptoed around the issues. Because the majority of voters who showed interest in candidate Kwon had ~~the~~ similar ideological leanings as candidate Roh, the votes that shifted to Kwon came mostly from Roh's support base. However, when the candlelight demonstrations became a nationwide rally in early December, poll ratings for Lee began to decline while Roh's showed an upward trend. The rising approval ratings for Roh can be attributed to his image as a progressive amidst the prevalent sentiment of anti-American ~~ism-sentiment~~.

The pledge to relocate the administrative capital also contributed to the upward trend in Roh's approval ratings. No particular presidential candidate had a stronghold in Chungcheong **Province** region, especially since Kim Jong-pil, leader of the minority opposition United Liberal Democrats (ULD, based in Chungcheong **Province** region), declared his intention not to endorse any candidates, ~~and with~~ Roh's pledge to build the administrative capital in Chungcheong **Province** region appealed strongly to the voters in the region ~~there~~. Such ~~an~~ empirical evidence as opinion polls show that Roh Moo-hyun's poll ratings were ahead of ~~his opponent Lee~~ Lee's by 5

percent.¹³ However, the final election results showed Roh's lead ~~by much greater~~ to be a far greater margins: 11 percent in ~~South~~-Chungcheongnam-do pProvince, 15.3 percent in Daejeon, and 7.5 percent in ~~North~~-Chungcheongbuk-do pProvince. The figures show that the pledge to build the administrative capital in the region significantly contributed to ~~increasing~~-Roh's having gained votes in the Chungcheong area. The ratios between support for and opposition ~~to~~ against the relocation of the administrative capital were similar nationwide, with the exception ~~for of~~ Seoul, where there was ~~a~~ greater opposition to the proposal. Overall, the relocation issue may be seen as less influential factor because its effect on the election was cancelled ~~in maintaining out a stable~~ conditions

V. Summary

— There are many factors that could explain the outcome and characteristics of the 2002 presidential election; however, ~~the primary focus of the paper was~~ this paper primarily focused on ~~the~~ issues raised during the campaign in order to study their content and understand their effects on the election. ~~As for how~~ How much influence the issues played ed on the outcome is still debatable. When ~~the an~~ election race becomes intense, issues become significant in shifting the voter's support. Moreover, in the democratic political process, the act of voting has its meaning in electing the candidate who could best represent the interests of the constituents. In this sense, issues become important in determining ~~the~~ voting behavior.

메모 [jbshin1]:

To sum up, the 2002 presidential election began with the prevalent pro-Lee Hoi-chang mood, giving the GNP too much confidence too early on in the race, ~~something~~ that ultimately led to its candidate's ~~Lee Hoi-chang's~~ defeat. After the congressional election in 2000, the GNP won all the elections by focusing on discrediting the Kim Dae-jung administration as a ~~corrupted~~ administration. Amidst such a favorable mood, the GNP decided to carry on its former campaign strategy. With ~~the overwhelming~~ odds against its winning the election overwhelmingly not in its favor, the MDP, with little room to consider other matters, focused only on preventing Lee Hoi-chang from winning. Accordingly, to turn the tide of the election, the MDP proposed ds a reform to

¹³ The ~~29~~ November-~~29~~ issue of *The Choson Ilbo* and December 9 issue of *The Dong-a Ilbo* both show a margin of 5 percent difference in the two candidates' poll ratings.

democratize the party by introducing ~~the a~~ nationwide primary election system to choose the presidential candidate.

All seemed to go well when Roh Moo-hyun, elected in the primaries as the MDP candidate, took the lead against Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP in popularity ratings in the opinion polls conducted in mid-May. But when the MDP suffered a crushing defeat in the local elections in June 2002 and Roh's popularity ratings plunged, it resulted in internal turmoil within the MDP. When Chung Mong-joon announced his bid for presidency, Chung's candidacy provided an outlet for the popular demand for a new era of Korean politics, and it seemed as though Roh would no longer be a strong contender for presidency. From the GNP and Roh Moo-hyun's perspective, anything that could keep Lee Hoi-chang from winning the election was considered a viable alternative, and it was this openness that led to the dramatic consolidation of candidacy between Roh and Chung. Despite their ideological differences, both Roh and Chung were able to lead a successful consolidation of candidacy by recognizing the overlaps in their support bases. That the MDP, without any certainty of Roh's victory, pursued the consolidation of candidacies with Chung Mong-joon of the National Alliance 21, a new party without any member of the National Assembly, shows that the MDP was willing to put Chung in office ~~if it could~~ prevent Lee from being elected. ~~This~~ shows that it was imperative for the MDP to prevent Lee Hoi-chang's victory and reveals the desperation of the MDP as a party without any vested interests.

~~The C~~candidate Lee Hoi-chang born in Chungcheong province ~~Province~~ and from the GNP, with its support base in Gyeong ~~Province~~ region, could no longer rely on regionalism. That the public had an aversion to regionalism and that the rival candidate Roh Moo-hyun was from the Kyeong ~~region~~ ~~Province~~ were reasons why the GNP had to abandon regionalism as its campaign strategy. Accordingly, regionalism lost much of its relevance as a determinant in voting behavior in Gyeong ~~Province~~ region. With the likelihood of votes splitting between Lee and Roh in Gyeong ~~region~~ ~~Province~~, the GNP needed a new campaign strategy to form a new support base but failed to come up with a viable plan. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun, as the MDP candidate, had the advantage of monopolizing the votes in ~~Cholla Province~~ Jeolla region. Moreover, the fact was that the Jeolla region ~~Cholla~~ primary was decisive in winning his candidacy for presidency, and Roh was confident in securing support in the region. Estimating that he could make up for the loss of votes due to regionalism with weakened regionalism in Kyeong ~~Province~~ region, ~~and~~ and with the absolute support from the Cholla Province Jeolla region, Roh

continued to build his image as ~~advocating an advocate for~~ the eradication of regionalism. Using such a strategy, Roh focused on raising new issues during the campaign. Such is the nature of contest between the old and new politics, and it reinforced the public's view of Lee Hoi-chang as representing the old generation of Korean politicians. To build a support base in Chungcheong ~~Province~~region, where many of the voters ~~are~~ ~~were~~ undecided, Roh proposed a pledge to relocate the administrative capital to the region towards the end of campaign. And the election results show that Roh led the votes in all regions except ~~the Kyongsang and Kangwon Provinces~~Gyeongsang and Gwangwon regions.

Dividing the determining factors of the election outcome into candidate ~~factor~~ and ~~the~~ party factors, Roh Moo-hyun's victory, despite the higher approval ratings for the opposition GNP, is ~~owed due~~ largely to his performance on the campaign issues. In spite of the odds against him in ~~the terms of~~ party ~~factor allegiance~~ and ~~the~~ regional support base (taking ~~into~~ account the large number of registered voters in the ~~Kyongsang Provinces~~Gyeongsang region), Roh Moo-hyun was able to gain more votes than his rival Lee by adopting the strategy of refraining from criticizing the incumbent administration, which helped to maintain his absolute support base in ~~Cholla-Jeolla region~~Provinces, ~~while~~ while also maintaining a certain distance from the government. The main factor in the GNP's defeat, despite its overwhelming victories in ~~the~~ general election, local elections, and by-elections, is ~~that~~ its strategy centered on the party, whereas the MDP's strategy, that of ~~that~~ focusing ~~ing~~ on the candidate, proved effective in mobilizing votes.

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